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I. INTRODUCTION
"[Mien forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of
their patrimony."'
-Niccol6 di Bernardo dei Machiavelli, Capitolo 17, II Principe
(1532)
Since the extraordinary plunge in oil prices beginning in late 2014,
mineral interest owners have found their royalties shrinking fast. Few
things rivet the attention and stoke suspicion more than a series of
royalty checks that shrink by two-thirds or more over just a year. Such
drops inspire lessee/lessor litigation as lessors take closer notice of the
language of division orders they once signed without a second glance.
Such division orders are now scrutinized more carefully, and every
deduction and charge is mulled over. Even more unfortunate, how-
ever, are the battles over ownership and the nature of freestanding
royalty interests carved from fee mineral estates in severances that are
sometimes many decades old. In these cases, not only are the original
perpetrators of the poorly drafted, contested instruments often long
gone, their descendants find themselves engaged in family-melting le-
gal conflagrations over millions of dollars of royalty, costing tens of
thousands of dollars and taking years to resolve. Royalty deduction
cases typically pit private lessors against corporations; cases between
freestanding royalty owners, such as the septet of cases that has
erupted in Texas over the last eight years, punctuated by a Texas Su-
preme Court decision in late January 2016, are far more harrowing, at
least from a m6nage perspective.
All seven of these Texas cases began with the separated threads of
an unraveled mineral interest. "A severed mineral estate [comprises]
five attributes: (1) the right to develop (the right to ingress and
egress), (2) the right to lease (the executive right), (3) the right to
receive bonus payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals, and (5)
the right to receive royalty payments."2 Each attribute is a separate,
distinct property interest hat may be conveyed or reserved in connec-
tion with a conveyance of a mineral interest. "However, '[w]hen an
undivided mineral interest is conveyed, reserved, or excepted, it is
1. NiCCoLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 67 (Luigi Ricci trans., Grant Richards
1903) (1532).
2. Hamilton v. Morris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2007, pet. denied) (first citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Tex. 1991); then
citing Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986)). "A conveyance of a mineral
estate need not dispose of all interests; individual interests can be held back, or re-
served, in the grantor." French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.
1995).
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presumed that all attributes remain with the mineral interest unless a
contrary intent [sic] is expressed."3
Royalty in the oil and gas context in Texas is commonly defined as a
nonpossessory interest in real property.' Owners of royalty receive a
fraction of the produced hydrocarbons without having to pay any of
the exploration and production costs.5 Because of problems such as
shoddy drafting and inconsistent judicial determinations, there has
arisen over the decades an enormous amount of litigation, academic
analysis, and general hand-wringing centered on whether a conveyed
or reserved interest is a royalty or a (generally fractional) interest in
the actual minerals-a bundle of sticks that when complete includes
the right to a landowner's royalty.
Royalty interests are often categorized into three distinct groups.
One is the lessor's (or landowner's) royalty, a royalty interest that is
retained when a mineral owner (the "landowner") executes a mineral
lease. This interest is effective during the duration of the lease and is
determined through a negotiation between the mineral owner and the
lessee, typically an oil and gas company or a broker. It is generally a
fixed fraction of the gross production, perhaps varying depending on
the volume of production.
Historically, the lessor's royalty began during the early 1900s as a
widely varying fraction; by the 1930s it had (gradually) settled across
the industry at 1/8 for both oil and gas produced. This equilibrium
lasted until roughly the mid-1970s, longer than the professional mem-
ory of lessors and lessees alike, when market forces driven by the ris-
ing prices of hydrocarbons finally overcame tradition and lessor's
royalties finally rose. During this stretch of almost fifty years, the idea
took hold that lessor's royalties would always be 1/8 for produced oil
and gas, even though other produced minerals (such as sulfur) re-
quired payment of other fractions, such as 1/10 or 1/16, as described in
the very same royalty clauses in the very same leases.6
After the 1970s, and through the present, the lessor's royalty for
produced oil and gas has most often been 1/6 or greater. Now, with
the advent of unconventional onshore plays, lease royalty has in-
3. French, 896 S.W.2d at 797 (quoting Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, 786
S.W.2d 667, 669 n.1 (Tex. 1990)) (In Day, the word is "intention" rather than
"intent.").
4. See 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL
AND GAS § 2.4[A], at 2-61 (2d ed. 2015).
5. Id.
6. See Wynne/Jackson Dev., L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-12-00449-
CV, 2013 WL 2470898, at *4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 6, 2013, pet. denied)
(reserving an NPRI measuring it as "a non-participating royalty of one-half (1/2) of
the usual one-eighth (1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas, and other materials produced,
saved and sold from the above-described property" (emphasis added)). This Author
has seen lessor's royalty due on produced minerals other than oil and gas measured as
fractions other than 1/8 in many instruments executed from the 1930s to the 1970s.
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creased dramatically, commonly reaching 1/5 or 1/4.' Leases issued by
the Texas General Land Office are now typically set at 1/4.8 Lease
bonuses topped $26,000 per mineral acre in the most prospective por-
tions of the Barnett Shale during the latter half of the 2000s.1
In contrast to a lessor's royalty, a non-participatory royalty interest
("NPRI") is an expense-free real-property mineral interest that does
not participate (hence the name) in collecting bonus or delay rentals,
leasing, or exploring and developing.10 This interest is "non-posses-
sory in that it does not entitle its owner to produce the minerals him-
self," as one Texas court described it." "It merely entitles its owner to
a share of the production proceeds, free of the expenses of explora-
tion and production."1 2 The size of an NPRI can be expressed in one
of two ways: The NPRI can be reserved or conveyed as a fixed frac-
tion of gross production, commonly 1/16, or it can be dependent upon
the lessor's royalty of the existing lease and every lease covering the
captioned land thereafter." In the second instance, the NPRI fraction
is typically multiplied by whatever lessor's royalty is found in the ex-
isting oil and gas lease covering the captioned land.1 4
Williams and Meyers have collected examples of "fixed NPRIs"
under which a fraction or percentage of gross production has been
granted or reserved:"
7. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 4, § 2.4[B][11, at 2-64.
8. Id.
9. Neighborhood Group Organizer Wins Burleson Council Seat, POWELL BUR-
NETr SHALE NEWSL., May 26, 2008, at 11, http://www.nctc.edu/docs/default-source/oil-
gas-adobe-files/PowellBarnettShaleNewsletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY6N-SHLJ].
10. See JOSEPH SHADE & RONNIE BLACKWELL, PRIMER ON THE TEXAS LAW OF
OIL AND GAS app. A (5th ed. 2013) (defining "nonparticipating royalty"). The third
kind of royalty, not discussed in this Article, is the overriding royalty interest. This is
described as "[a]n interest in oil and gas produced at the surface, free of the expense
of production. In modern times overriding royalty interests usually refers to a non
cost bearing interest carved out of the lessee's working interest under an oil and gas
lease." Id. A "freestanding royalty" is synonymous with an NPRI.
11. Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 491 n.1 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2008, pet. denied).
12. Id.; Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1995); Hamil-
ton v. Morris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet.
denied).
13. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 4, § 2.4[B][2], at 2-64.
14. Id. For example, the owner of an NPRI that gave him the right to "one-eighth
of royalty" would be entitled to receive 1/64 of the gross production from a lease
containing a 1/8 lessor's royalty (1/8 x 1/8), but would receive 1/48 of the gross produc-
tion from a lease containing a 1/6 lessor's royalty (1/8 x 1/6). This amount is deducted
from the lessor's royalty owed to the lessor himself. Unless uncommon terms are at
play, the lessee continues to pay only the amount of the lessor's royalty; he does not
typically pay the sum of the lessor's royalty and the NPRI.
15. 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL
AND GAS LAW § 327.1, at 81 (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., 2015).
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* "a one-fourth royalty in all oil, gas and other minerals in and
under and hereafter produced";1 6
* "a fee royalty of 1/32 of the oil and gas";"
* "an undivided one-sixteenth royalty interest of any oil, gas or
minerals that may hereafter be produced";"
* "one-half of the one-eight[h] royalty interest";19
* "an undivided 1/24 of all the oil, gas and other minerals pro-
duced, saved, and made available for market";2 0
* "[one percent] royalty of all the oil and gas produced and
saved[.] "21
The same treatise also provides examples of "floating NPRIs"
under which the amount of production received by the royalty owner
fluctuates according to the amount of lessor's royalty provided for in
the lease.22 These include:
* "1/16 of all [the] oil royalty"; 23
* "[t]he undivided 2/3 of all royalties";2 4
* "[olne-half interest in all royalties received from any oil and gas
leases" ;25
* "[a]n undivided one-half interest in and to all of the royalty";2 6
* "[o]ne-half of one-eighth of the oil, gas and other mineral roy-
alty that may be produced";27
* "one-half of the usual one-eighth royalty."28
16. Id. (quoting Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
17. Id. (quoting Caraway v. Owens, 254 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1953, writ ref'd)).
18. Id. (quoting Masterson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 301 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
19. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Duvall v. Stone, 213 P.2d 212, 213 (N.M.
1949)).
20. Id. (quoting Miller v. Speed, 259 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1952, no writ)).
21. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Hannah, 208 P.2d 812, 812 (Mont. 1949)).
22. Id. at 83-84.
23. Id. at 83 (alteration in original) (quoting Crews v. Burke, 309 P.2d 291, 293
(Okla. 1957)).
24. Id. at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting Meeks v. Harmon, 250 P.2d 203, 205
(Okla. 1952)).
25. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Land Bank of Wichita v. Nicholson,
251 P.2d 490, 491 (Okla. 1952)).
26. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State Nat'l Bank of Corpus Christi v. Mor-
gan, 143 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1940)).
27. Id. (quoting Harriss v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. 1955)).
28. Id. (citing Butler v. Horton, 447 S.W.3d 514, 518 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2014,
no pet.)).
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Each example in the first list represents a royalty of an exact, calcu-
lable magnitude. Each example in the second list-most containing
the word "of," which commonly acts as a multiplication sign in such
instances-is dependent on the magnitude of the lessor's royalty in a
future lease and thus can vary in magnitude over time.
Conundrums have sometimes arisen over whether a particular re-
served or conveyed NPRI is a "fixed" or "floating" royalty interest.
The presumption that lessor's royalties would remain 1/8 would have
remained a historical footnote if perpetual NPRI conveyances made
during this "lessor's royalty is always 1/8" period had not inadver-
tently introduced ambiguity into the mix.
A. Multiple Fractions
A classic interpretation problem is presented when language in the
conveyance or reservation could be read to convey or reserve either a
fixed or floating NPRI. A classic example was provided by Sundance
Minerals, L.P. v. Moore wherein a dispute over whether the reserva-
tion of an undivided 1/2 interest in and to all of the royalty that may
be payable under any and all oil and gas leases, by which royalty is
meant 1/8 of production reserved a fixed NPRI (1/2 of 1/8 = 1/16) or a
floating NPRI (1/2 of [whatever the lessor's royalty is of any future
lease]).29 As discussed below, while the courts historically favored
finding a fixed royalty where no other language in the instrument gave
any further hints as to the drafter's intent, in Sundance, the court set
aside judicial recognition of the usual 1/8 lessor's royalty, despite the
express reference to that royalty in the deed, and found that a floating
NPRI was reserved by the grantor.
Sometimes called a "double fraction" problem, fixed vs. floating
NPRI issues are often encountered in the form of an instrument ex-
pressing an (often reserved) NPRI as the product of two fractions,
such as "1/2 of the usual 1/8." Disputes arise about whether such
double fractions must be multiplied and the royalty interest fixed
without regard to the royalty negotiated in a future mineral lease (a
fixed NPRI) or whether 1/8 was intended as a synonym for any quan-
tity of lessor's royalty negotiated in the future (a floating NPRI).o
The Texas Supreme Court, in early 2016, noted that "[t]he proper con-
struction of instruments containing double-fraction language is a di-
lemma of increasing concern in the oil and gas industry, as uncertainty
29. Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2011, pet. denied).
30. See Laura H. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds: The Legacy of
the One-Eighth Royalty and Other Stories, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 4 (2001) (discussing
at length both the "double fraction" or "restated fraction" problem as well as "estate
misconception"-the confusion created by further-explanation clauses such as the
reservation of "an undivided one-half non-participating royalty" followed by the par-
enthetical, "([b]eing equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th) of all the oil, gas and
minerals . . . .").
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abounds, disputes proliferate, and courts have seemingly varied in
their approaches to this complicated issue."3
Current title examiners sometimes wonder why early mineral deeds
contained different fractions in initial granting and subsequent sub-
ject-to and future lease provisions. One reason, other than those aris-
ing from various manifestations of poor draftsmanship-math errors,
forgotten prior reservations, tortuous language-is the historical pla-
teau of 1/8 lessor's royalty that lasted for approximately half a cen-
tury. In 1984, the Kansas Supreme Court took judicial notice of this
when it considered a 1925 deed that granted "an undivided 1/16 inter-
est in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals" and later stipulated
that if the captioned land was covered by a lease, the grantees "shall
have an undivided 1/2 interest in the Royalties, Rentals, and Proceeds
therefrom."3 2 The Court stated that "the use of the fraction '1/16' in
the initial clause of this mineral deed was simply an error commonly
made in the early days of oil and gas conveyancing."3 3 The confusion
is not uncommon today. In Shepard v. John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Co., there is an excellent discussion of this early-day miscon-
ception and misuse of the fraction "1/16" when "1/2" was really
intended.34 Referencing Shepard, the Supreme Court of Kansas said
in Heyen v. Harnett:
As the most common leasing arrangement provides for a one-
eighth royalty reserved to the lessor, the confusion of fractional in-
terests stems primarily from the mistaken premise that all the les-
sor-landowner owns is a one-eighth royalty. In conveying minerals
subject to an existing lease and also assigning a corresponding frac-
tional interest in the royalties received, [a] mistake is often made in
the fraction of the minerals conveyed by multiplying the intended
fraction by one-eighth. Thus, if a conveyance of an undivided one-
half of the minerals is intended, the parties will multiply one-half by
one-eighth and the instrument will erroneously specify a convey-
ance of one-sixteenth of the minerals upon the assumption that one-
sixteenth is one-half of what the grantor owns. An ambiguity is cre-
ated because the instrument will also show that the conveyance of
one-sixteenth of the minerals is meant to entitle the grantor to one-
half of the royalty. Of course, an undivided one-half of the minerals
is needed to carry one-half of any royalties reserved.
And so here. In computing the fractional interest re-
served the parties were aware of the existence of the Jen-
nings leases providing for 1/8th royalty to the landowner,
and it is obvious the scrivener multiplied 1/4th by 1/8th and
the instrument erroneously specified a reservation of 1/
32nd as the interest reserved, apparently upon the assump-
31. Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2016).
32. Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1154, 1158-59 (Kan. 1984).
33. Id. at 1158.
34. Shepard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 368 P.2d 19, 26-27 (Kan. 1962).
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tion that 1/32nd interest in and to all oil, gas or other min-
erals, would constitute ownership of 1/4th of the
landowners' 1/8th royalty, when the intention of the reser-
vation as disclosed by its other terms indicate that the frac-
tion 1/4th should have been used instead of the fraction 1/
32nd. When this is done, the intent of the grantor is clear
and no ambiguity exists. Hence, contrary to plaintiffs' con-
tention, no occasion exists for the application of any rule
of construction to aid in the interpretation of the
reservation.
On the basis of the reasoning set forth above, we hold that the
ambiguous mineral deed of 1925 should be construed to convey to
the grantees an undivided 1/2 interest in the oil and gas and other
minerals in and under the land in question, so as to carry out the
intention of the parties to give the grantees and their successors in
title an undivided 1/2 interest in the royalties produced under the
lannitti lease.35
A clever but unsuccessful argument based on the prevalence of the
1/8 landowner's royalty throughout most of the twentieth century was
advanced in Hudspeth v. Berry." The case involved a 1943 convey-
ance in which two brothers granted each of their individual one-third
interests in a mineral estate to their third brother while each grantor
reserved an "undivided 1/40th royalty interest (being 1/5th of
1/8th)."3 More than sixty years later, the successor of the grantee exe-
cuted an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/5 royalty.38 The successors
of the grantors argued that because 1/8 was the standard lessor's roy-
alty for several decades in the early and middle 1900s, the term
"1/8th" was synonymous with "lessor's royalty" and therefore could
be replaced with "lessor's royalty," and they were therefore each enti-
tled to 1/5 of the 1/5 royalty that the plaintiff had reserved in the oil
and gas lease.9 The court rejected the argument, pointing out that the
1943 deed did not contain conflicting fractions but plainly reserved
two fixed 1/40 royalty interests.4 0
II. PRIOR CASE LAW & COMMENTARY
Related to the problem of fixed vs. floating royalty is the larger
problem of multiple granting/reservation clauses that seemingly en-
tangle the various mineral "sticks" with multiple clauses using multi-
ple fractions. Perhaps resulting from the work of inexperienced
drafters, such instruments often contain a clear statement of convey-
35. Heyen, 679 P.2d at 1158-59 (quoting Shepard, 368 P.2d at 26-27).
36. Hudspeth v. Berry, No. 2-09-225-CV, 2010 WL 2813408 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth July 15, 2010, no pet.).
37. Id. at *2.
38. Id. at *1.
39. Id. at *2-3.
40. Id. at *4.
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ance or reservation followed by one or more involved "clarifying"
clauses that, as described in the cases they spawn, do little to clarify
and may actually contradict the first clause.
"Altman v. Blake, cited by many sources as the definitive Texas case
for the proposition that the mineral estate consists of five distinct
sticks, seemed to help usher in the modern view of the five-faceted
separable mineral estate."4 1 In Altman, the owner of an entire fee
mineral estate was held by the Texas Supreme Court to have retained
a fee mineral interest despite having conveyed away the right to col-
lect delay rentals and the executive right.42 The Court noted that it
had "before recognized that a mineral interest shorn of the executive
right and the right to receive delay rentals remains an interest in the
mineral fee."43
One of the first Texas decisions that tackled an instrument with
multiple fractions was Tipps v. Bodine.44 The granting clause seem-
ingly conveyed a 1/16 interest in the minerals.45 If so, the grantee
would receive only 1/16 of royalties payable under any future leases,
along with 1/16 of delay rentals, and 1/16 of any bonus-a 1/16 frac-
tion of each. Further on, however, the drafters might have outsmarted
themselves by inserting three other clauses under which the grantor
effectively conveyed a larger fraction of each the lessor's royalty, de-
lay rentals, and bonus. Specifically, the instrument then conveyed a
1/2 interest in any benefits received "under the existing lease, a 1/2
interest in the possibility of reverter and executive rights,"4 6 "a 1/2
interest in all benefits under future leases," and, giving a brief lesson
in daffy drafting, "a 1/2 interest in all future events."4 7 The Sixth
Court of Appeals in Texarkana held that these provisions, in toto, re-
sulted in grants of a 1/2 interest in the mineral fee even though the
initial granting clause specified "1/16."48 The drafter's intent was con-
jured from the four corners of the document.
Twenty years later, in 1957, the situation encountered by the Texas
Supreme Court in Garrett v. Dils Co.4 9 was similar to that in Tipps.
The first granting clause provided for the conveyance of a 1/64 interest
in the minerals; a later clause, however, identified the existing lease
over the captioned land and provided that "this sale . . . covers and
41. Christopher S. Kulander, The Executive Right to Lease Mineral Real Property
in Texas Before and After Lesley v. Veterans Land Board, 44 ST. MARY'S L.J. 529, 543
(2013).
42. Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 119-20 (Tex. 1986).
43. Id. at 118-19.
44. Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ
ref'd).
45. Id.
46. The "lease interest," according to the Texas Supreme Court in Concord Oil
Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex. 1998).
47. Id.; Tipps, 101 S.W.2d at 1079.
48. Tipps, 101 S.W.2d at 1079.
49. Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957).
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includes one-eighth of all . . . rental or royalty due."5 0 The deed in
Garrett also had a clause addressing the future: It stated that the
grantee would own "an undivided one-eighth of the lease interest and
all future rentals . . . and other mineral privileges . . . [the grantee]
owning one-eighth of one-eighth of all oil, gas, and other minerals ...
together with one-eighth interest in all future rentals."5 1 The Court
held that because the grantee now had the right to receive 1/8 of the
royalty, 1/8 of the "lease interest" (i.e., the executive right to lease),
and 1/8 of future rentals, the grantee was now "the owner of one-
eighth of the minerals in the land."" Once again, the Court used the
"four corners" of the instrument to define what the grantee acquired,
which amounted to 1/8 of all the attributes of mineral ownership.
Contemplating once again the troublesome reservation construc-
tion, "an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the royalty that
may be payable under any and all oil and gas leases, by which royalty
is meant one-eighth of production," two commentators have opined
that such language plainly indicates that the parties believed they
were dealing with a 1/8 lessor's royalty from which the NPRI would be
deducted, and therefore the reservation specified a fixed 1/8 lessor's
royalty. Since the reservation comes out of the royalty amount owed
the lessor, the lessor is left with 1/16, provided that the lessor's royalty
was 1/8.5
The four corners rule provides that the meaning of an instrument
deemed unambiguous is to be divined from the words of the instru-
ment alone. The four corners rule "bars the parties to a written con-
tract that is 'clear on its face'-meaning that a reader who is
competent in English but unaware of the agreement's context would
think the writing admitted of only one meaning-from presenting evi-
dence bearing on interpretation, which is to say 'extrinsic' evidence-
evidence outside the 'four corners' of the written contract," one tire-
less commentator noted." "The judge alone determines what the con-
tract means when no extrinsic evidence is presented because he is a
more competent interpreter of a document than a jury is." 5 6 The exe-
cuted instrument and its exhibits are presumed to embody the entire
agreement, and Texas courts typically do not impute into the instru-
ment additional provisions.57
In order to understand where the law resides today with regard to
the fixed vs. floating royalty conundrum in Texas, it helps to examine
50. Id. at 906.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 907.
53. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 4, § 2.4[B][3], at 2-65.
54. Id.
55. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEx. L. REV. 1581, 1596 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1941).
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earlier fixed vs. floating case law landmarks. The saga is hardly
straightforward.
A. Alford v. Krum and the Repugnant-to-the-Grant Theory
The four corners rule did not initially carry over to fixed vs. floating
royalty questions. Before the early 1990s, most courts resolved contra-
dictory NPRI reservation/conveyance descriptions by utilizing the "re-
pugnant-to-the-grant" theory, made popular in Texas by the case of
Alford v. Krum." In that case, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a
granting clause conveyed a 1/16 mineral interest despite the fact that
the actual language of the clause described the interest as a multiple
of a fraction-1/2 of 1/8.'9 Specifically, in Alford, a mineral convey-
ance from 1929 granted a "one-half of the one-eighth interest in and
to all of the oil, gas and other minerals."60 This was followed by a
provision noting that the conveyance "covers and includes 1/16 of all
the oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due and to be paid under the
terms of said lease."61 Both clauses were then topped off with the rec-
ognition that future leases might follow and, in such cases, the grantor
and grantee would each own "a one-half interest in all oil, gas and
other minerals in and upon said land, together with one-half interest
in all future rents."6 2
Litigation ensued, with courts asked to consider whether the
grantee received a 1/2 mineral interest or only a 1/16 mineral inter-
est-1/2 of 1/8. The Texas Supreme Court majority, its eye seemingly
fixed on a policy of title clarity, noted the "clear and unambiguous
language of the granting clause" and held that the deed conveyed only
a perpetual 1/16 mineral interest to the grantee.63 The Court formu-
lated a bright-line rule:
In cases involving the construction of mineral deeds, the "control-
ling language" and the "key expression of intent" is to be found in
the granting clause, as it defines the nature of the permanent min-
eral estate conveyed. It logically follows that when there is an irrec-
oncilable conflict between clauses of a deed, the granting clause
prevails over all other provisions.64
As one commentator opined, the majority ignored the lease clauses
covering the present lease and any future leases as they muddied "the
58. Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984), overruled by Luckel v. White, 819
S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
59. See id. at 873-74; Krum v. Alford, 653 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1982), rev'd, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
60. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 871.
61. Id. at 872.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 874.
64. Id. at 872 (citation omitted).
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clear and unambiguous language of the granting clause."6 5 Such a rule
empowered Texas courts to declare such "present" and "future" lease
clauses as found in Alford unambiguously "repugnant" to the granting
clause and thus allowed them to ignore such clauses as a matter of
law.66 As David Pierce notes:
Because [the 'present' and 'future' lease clauses] conflict[ ] with the
granting clause, a judge might be inclined to declare the conveyance
"ambiguous" to allow the court to conduct a wider search of the
facts for the parties' meaning. However, this result is avoided by
[Alford] .... Once they are eliminated from the analysis, we are left
with "the clear and unambiguous language of the granting
clause . . . ." This allows the court to remove conflicting language
from the express terms of the deed before it considers whether it is
ambiguous.
.. . The court applied a rule to ensure the document remained
"unambiguous" and then used the same rule to assign a generic
meaning to the language in the document.
Alford, therefore, essentially ignores language subsequent to the
granting clause that may conflict with the express result of the grant-
ing clause. While Alford would seemingly tarnish the intent of drafters
in some instances, presumably Texas title examiners could more easily
interpret mineral deeds by simply ignoring language that challenged
the granting clause.
The three dissenting justices in Alford read the future lease clause
as a separate grant, turning away from a perceived failure by the ma-
jority to examine the four corners of the instrument in an effort to
give effect to all the provisions in the deed and the intent of the
drafters.
B. Luckel v. White, Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, and the
"Two-Grant" Doctrine
The minority's time would soon come. Seven years later, the Texas
Supreme Court changed course with the majority's opinion in Luckel
v. White, wherein the Court held that conveyances should generally be
interpreted by harmonizing all of the provisions rather than allowing
the first granting provision primacy over subsequent grants.6 8
Under the "two-grant" doctrine, a deed with multiple clauses is con-
strued as making separate grants of different types of interests in a
particular tract of property or varying sizes of one interest at different
65. David E. Pierce, Interpreting Oil and Gas Instruments, 1 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, &
ENERGY L. 1, 9 (2006) (citing Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 874).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 874).
68. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991).
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times.6 9 One commentator has noted the two-grant theory works only
if it is supposed that only one grant functions at a time.70 That suppo-
sition, however, typically conflicts with the express language of both
the initial granting/reservation clause and subsequent "further expla-
nation" or "subject to" clauses. Deeds where the fractions used in the
granting clause and in the subsequent "covers and includes" clause, or
its equivalent, are not consistent with each other have provided the
most controversial applications of the two-grant theory. If, for exam-
ple, the land is subject to an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/8 les-
sor's royalty, the granting clause may purport to convey 1/32 of the oil
and gas beneath the tract, while the "subject to" clause states that the
deed covers and includes 1/4 of all rents and royalties under the out-
standing lease and under all future leases.
Luckel illustrates the problems involved in construing this type of
deed, as it deals with a royalty deed containing terms that, so long as
the royalty payable under any future lease over the captioned land
was 1/8, it remained consistent with the other deed provisions. The
granting and warranty clauses of the royalty deed provided for a 1/32
non-participating royalty interest.71 In contrast, a subsequent provi-
sion describing an existing lease and another provision addressing the
possibility of subsequent leases stated, respectively, that the grantee
would "receive one-fourth" and "be entitled to one-fourth" of all roy-
alties.72 This would, of course, equal a 1/32 royalty under a 1/8 royalty
lease-the prevailing oil and gas royalty at the time. Problems in con-
struing the deed arose, however, with subsequent leases that provided
for a 1/6 royalty73-1/4 of 1/6 does not equal 1/32. The Court ruled
that a 1/4 of royalty-a "floating" royalty based upon the product of
1/4 and whatever the future lease's royalty fraction might be-re-
sulted rather than a "fixed" 1/32 royalty.74
Interestingly, the Court went on to provide that the "floating" roy-
alty could never be below 1/32-the contrasting language was held to
provide a "floor" value for the grantee's royalty.75 In the unlikely cir-
cumstance that a future lease contained, say, a 1/10 royalty, that would
still provide the grantee with a 1/32 royalty and not a 1/40 royalty (1/4
of 1/10), as the 1/4 of royalty otherwise payable under any given lease
could not result in less than a 1/32 royalty.
69. See generally Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doc-
trine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REv. 73 (1993).
70. See David E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The
Continuing Search for Analytical Foundations, in 47 OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION
§ 1.05, at 1-24 (1996).
71. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461.
72. Id. (emphasis omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 464.
75. Id. at 464-65.
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The Texas Supreme Court held that the majority in Alford had
failed to harmonize the provisions as required by the "four corners
rule." 7 6 Contemporaneously with Luckel, the Texas Supreme Court
decided Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow,7 7 a case involving a granting clause in
a mineral deed that first provided for a conveyance of a 1/16 mineral
interest: "all that certain undivided 1/16 interest in and to all the oil,
gas, and other minerals of whatsoever kind and character in and under
the following described lot.""7
The next paragraph acknowledged that the tract in dispute was
under lease at the time. Another paragraph in the deed, however, ad-
dressed an existing lease and provided that the parties intended that
the grantee should receive a 1/16 interest in the minerals produced
from the existing lease and that the parties intended for the grantor to
convey "1/2 of the interest they now have in any such production
under said lease.",7 The existing lease provided for a (then typical) 1/8
royalty.so A third provision in the contested deed provided that upon
expiration of the then-existing lease, the grantee would "have and
hold" the following:
[I]n the event the lease now on said land is forfeited or terminated
withouft] producing mineral of any kind, then the grantee herein or
his assigns are to have and hold under this conveyance an undivided
1/2 of all the oil. [sic] gas or other mineral of whatsoever kind char-
acter in and under the land herein described, and it is the intention
of the grantors herein that in the event said lease is forfeited, then
in that event the grantee is to have and hold an equal undivided one
half of all such minerals.8 1
The successor-grantor argued that this meant the grantee, upon
deed execution and delivery, would receive a 1/16 royalty interest in
the existing lease and would own a 1/16 mineral interest after the lease
expired. The successor-grantee argued that this meant the deed passed
a 1/2 interest with the possibility of reverter in the minerals (with the
lessee holding a fee simple determinable), and the grantee owned an
undivided fifty percent mineral interest upon termination of the then-
existing lease.
The conveyance was first held to be unambiguous.82 Then the
Court, trying to harmonize all the terms of the deed-and apparently
trying to give specific meaning to the "one-half of the interest they
now have in such production under said lease" language-held that
the deed immediately gave the grantee a 1/16 interest in the mineral
76. Id. at 464.
77. Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991).
78. Id. at 468.
79. Snow v. Jupiter Oil Co., 802 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990),
rev'd, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991).
80. Jupiter Oil, 819 S.W.2d at 467.
81. Id. at 468 (alteration in original).
82. Id. at 469.
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estate.8 3 Upon the termination of the then-existing lease, fee simple
title revested in the grantor.84 The third paragraph then conveyed
one-half of the grantor's possibility of reverter, so that when the then-
existing lease ended, the grantee's interest in the mineral estate simul-
taneously expanded into a full one-half by operation of law.15 Alford
was expressly found inapplicable.8 6 Had the Court's jurisprudence in
Alford been followed, one suspects that the Court would not have re-
versed and instead held that the first clause simply trumped the later
language regarding the passage of a one-half interest and ruled that
only a post-lease 1/16 mineral interest had passed. Jupiter Oil did not
delve as deeply into the jurisprudential and policy reasons for why
Alford was inapplicable in Luckel, but the result was fully consistent
with Luckel.
Luckel and Jupiter Oil eliminated the repugnant-to-the-grant rule
of construction that had been adopted in Alford with a definitive
knell, opting instead for the "four corners" approach currently applied
to instruments deemed unambiguous in Texas: the intent of the parties
is to be determined (or surmised) at law by attempting to harmonize
all the provisions of the instrument in question." This task was later
summarized in J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster: "[Wle must examine
and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give ef-
fect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered
meaningless."" "No single provision taken alone will be given con-
trolling effect; rather, all the [deed] provisions must be considered
with reference to the whole instrument."8 9
In Luckel and Jupiter Oil, the granting clause expressed a smaller
fixed fractional interest conveyance (a 1/32 royalty in Luckel and a
1/16 mineral interest in Jupiter Oil) than the floating royalty convey-
ance or mineral interest in subsequent parts of the conveyance (a 1/4
of royalty in Luckel and a 1/2 interest in production under any current
lease, followed later in the conveyance by a 1/2 interest in all minerals,
in Jupiter Oil). In both instruments, the conveyance appeared to con-
tain clear and unambiguous provisions that provided for what interest
the grantee was to receive under various subsequent circumstances. In
both cases, the subsequent fractions were harmonious in all clauses
except the initial granting clause. More importantly, in both cases,
when all the received interests of the grantee under the provisions
subsequent to the granting clause were compiled, the grantee had (de-
83. Id. at 468-69; id. at 469 (Hecht, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 469 (majority opinion).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 467.
87. Id. at 468; Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Tex. 1991).
88. J.M. Davidson Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003).
89. Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex.
2006) (quoting Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)).
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pendent on the measure of lessor's royalty in Luckel) received a larger
estate than granted by the opening granting clause.
Of course, these decisions should not imply that no grant or assign-
ment can be interpreted to convey royalty and/or mineral interests of
different amounts. A grantor of a royalty or mineral interest may con-
vey one or more, or fractions of one or more, of any attribute of the
mineral estate, all royalty or a fraction of royalties, the right to receive
delay rentals or shut-in royalties, and the executive right to lease. The
litigation begins when different fractions appear in the conveyance,
giving rise to a question of subsequent ownership, and a court must
attempt to determine the intent of the drafters from the "four cor-
ners" of the instrument.
C. Prior Contrasting Decisions
Cases involving instruments conveying and reserving fractional roy-
alty interests in land subject to an oil and gas lease and containing
references to rights in future leases have gone both ways before-
even from the same court inside of a decade. For example, Hausser v.
Cuellar, where, in 1936, respondents' predecessors-whose land was
subject to an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/8 royalty-executed a
deed granting "an undivided (1/2) interest in and to all of the oil roy-
alty [and] gas royalty" and providing that if a future lease was exe-
cuted after the termination of the existing lease, "the Grantees shall
receive under such future lease or leases one sixteenth (1/16) part of
all oil, gas and other minerals."9 0 In 2006, decades after the original
lease had terminated, the grantor's successors executed a new lease
providing for a 1/4 royalty." Claimants, who were the successors of
the grantees in the 1936 deed, brought suit for a declaratory judgment
that they were entitled to one-half of the 1/4 royalty, i.e., 1/8 of pro-
duction, rather than only 1/16 of production, as contended by the de-
fendant.9 2 In ruling'for the plaintiffs, the court pointed to the absence
of any language in the 1936 deed suggesting that two different estates
were being conveyed, i.e., a present right to one-half of royalty and a
future right to a 1/16 royalty; rather, the deed conveyed a single, fixed
estate of one-half of royalty." Contrast that holding with the Fourth
Court of Appeals's earlier construction of a similar deed in Neel v.
Killam Oil Co. Ltd.,94 in which it had reached the opposite result. The
court distinguished the two cases on the ground that the Neel decision
did not rely entirely upon the language of the deed at issue, but was
90. Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 467-68 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011,
pet. denied) (en banc).
91. Id. at 465.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 470-71.
94. Neel v. Killam Oil Co., 88 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet.
denied).
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based, in part, upon an earlier deed in which the grantor of the deed
in Neel had received only a 1/16 royalty and hence could convey only
as much as he owned.9 5
Coghill v. Griffith is illustrative of the current application of the
modern interpretive approach spawned by Luckel.9 6 In 1961, Wood,
Coghill's predecessor, who had executed an oil and gas lease provid-
ing for a 1/8 lessor's royalty, conveyed the leased land to Welch, the
Griffiths' predecessor.9 7 In the deed the grantor reserved "an undi-
vided one-eighth (1/8) interest in and to all of the oil royalty [and] gas
royalty" under the existing lease "as well as an undivided one-eighth
(1/8) of the usual one-eighth (1/8) royalties provided for in any future
oil, gas and/or mineral lease."98 A further provision stipulated that the
grantee would never execute a new oil and gas lease unless the lease
provided "for at least a royalty on oil of the usual one-eighth (1/8),"
and if the grantee or a successor developed the minerals, the grantor
was entitled to receive "as a free royalty hereunder, (1) an undivided
one-sixty fourth [sic] (1/64)."99 After the original lease terminated,
Welch, the original grantee, executed two new oil and gas leases pro-
viding for a 3/16 royalty and subsequently signed a division order
showing that both he and Coghill, who had inherited the grantor's in-
terest, were each entitled to 1/8 of the 3/16 royalty.100 Subsequently,
the Griffiths purchased Welch's interest in the property and disputed
Coghill's claim to 1/8 of the lease royalty.101 They argued that the orig-
inal deed had reserved only a right to 1/64 of production.1.0 2 The court
held that the 1961 deed specifically reserved a right to 1/8 of royalty in
the existing lease and in future leases-a "floating" royalty.1.0 3 The
references to the usual 1/8 royalty did not compel a conclusion that
the parties to the deed intended to limit the reservation to a fixed 1/64
royalty.10 4 Similarly, the requirement that future leases provide for "at
least" a 1/8 royalty and that the grantor receive 1/64 of production if
the grantee or his successors developed the land was included to guar-
antee that the reserved royalty would never be less than 1/64 of pro-
duction.0 s Setting a floor on the royalty did not indicate an intent to
limit the royalty to the amount guaranteed by the floor.10 6
Some deeds describe a reserved or conveyed royalty interest with
an initial fraction, followed by a clause that attempts to clarify or aug-
95. Hausser, 345 S.W.3d at 469-70 (citing Neel, 88 S.W.3d at 340-41).
96. Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2012, pet. denied).
97. Id. at 835.
98. Id. at 835-36 (emphasis added).




103. Id. at 839-40.
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ment the language containing the first fraction, often in a parentheti-
cal. The majority in Alford did not consider or address the significance
of why the drafters of the disputed conveyance would list two frac-
tions (1/2 and 1/8) instead of 1/16. This problem has been bracketed
by the Texas Supreme Court in two cases noteworthy not only for the
differences in the deed language interpreted but also for the dissents
encountered.
In Brown v. Havard, the Browns granted some mineral rights while
reserving to themselves a perpetual "one-half non-participating roy-
alty ([b]eing equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th) of all the oil,
gas and other minerals, in, to and under or that may be produced from
said land."'0 Later, successor grantee Havard leased the land for a 3/8
landowner's royalty.10 When a well was brought in, the Browns re-
fused to execute division orders, providing that their interest was 1/16,
instead demanding 1/2 of the 3/8 royalty under the current lease.10 9
Setting aside a jury verdict for Havard, the district judge found for
Brown, holding that such conveyance language unambiguously
reserves a floating royalty computed against the royalty fraction in
any later lease.10 The court of appeals found the conveyance lan-
guage at issue to be ambiguous, allowing consideration of evidence
outside the deed.1
A majority of the Texas Supreme Court also found the language at
issue subject to more than one interpretation, noting that "ambiguity
arises from the inclusion of the parenthetical phrase, ([b]eing equal to,
not less than an undivided 1/16th)."11 2 Three justices dissented, hold-
ing that the contested language unambiguously reserved a 1/2 royalty
interest in whatever a subsequent lease provided for in its applicable
royalty clause-in this case, 1/2 of 3/8, or 3/16.'13 The dissenters noted
that the "not less than" language indicated that the drafters had not
only contemplated future leases with royalty values different than 1/8
but also provided for a base level below which the reserved royalty
could not fall in value-1/16.1 4
One commentator has applauded the dissent's approach: First, it
provides for a bright-lined holding and thus stability and consistency
in title work, and second, it gives "weight" to both the "1/2" and
"1/16" fractions in the reservation.1 15
107. Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Tex. 1980).
108. Id. at 940-41.
109. Id. at 941.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 942.
113. Id. at 945 (McGee, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 946.
115. Burney, supra note 30, at 28.
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III. AMBIGUITY AND RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND GRAMMAR
The above panoply of cases shows the evolution of the interpreta-
tion of instruments with conflicting NPRI reservations and convey-
ances; and of the definition of the various aspects of the mineral
estate, generally, and quantitative aspects of NPRIs, specifically.
When interpreting these troublesome instruments, the first hurdle is
to consider whether the instrument is ambiguous or not.
A. On Ambiguity
In Texas, an oil and gas deed is a contract and must be interpreted
as a contract.'1 6 A contract or provision is ambiguous if it is reasona-
bly susceptible to more than one interpretation.11 7 When considering
the presence of ambiguity, a court may consider how someone who is
familiar with the customs, practices, and terminology as generally un-
derstood by a particular trade or business would read such a provi-
sion."' The instrument should be considered in light of the
circumstances in which it was drafted.11 9 A provision in an instrument
is not ambiguous simply because the parties to the case dispute its
proper interpretation or offer alternative constructions.1 2 0
Several canons of construction impact the determination of ambigu-
ity. Important in fixed vs. floating NPRI debates, when balancing dif-
ferent words and phrases, the more specific and detailed govern the
general.121 Terms and phrases repeated in different portions of the
contested instrument all have the same meaning.12 2 When determin-
ing whether ambiguity is present, courts consider both the express
116. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. Hyder, 427 S.W.3d 472, 475 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2014, pet. granted) (first citing Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857,
860 (Tex. 2005); then citing Hitzelberger v. Samedan Oil Corp., 948 S.W.2d 497, 503
(Tex. App.-Waco 1997, pet. denied)).
117. Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) (citing
Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)).
118. Schwartz v. Prairie Producing Co., 727 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445,
449-50 (Tex. 2011) (quoting David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Tex.
2008) (per curiam)).
120. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 446 (Tex. 2009) ("A
dispute over meaning does not render a text ambiguous; many disputes lack sub-
stance." (footnote omitted)).
121. Shell v. Austin Rehearsal Complex, Inc., No. 03-97-00411-CV, 1998 WL
476728, at *12 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (first citing Guadalupe-Blanco River
Auth. v. City of San Antonio, 200 S.W.2d 989, 1001 (Tex. 1947); then citing City of San
Antonio v. Heath & Stich, Inc., 567 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
122. See Tex. Osage Co-op Royalty Pool, Inc. v. Thomas, 270 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[T]he words 'stipulated surveys' in the
above quoted provision of the second deed was [sic] intended by the parties to have
the same meaning as intended in the first deed of the same date and between the
same parties . . . .").
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words and phrases of the instrument itself and the inferences that can
be drawn from those express words and phrases.12 3 When dealing with
sophisticated parties like oil and gas companies, however, courts are
more likely to give deference to the express language used.12 4 Uncer
tainty or lack of clarity in the language chosen by the parties typically
does not render an instrument ambiguous.12 5 Generally, silence on a
disputed point does not make an instrument ambiguous in itself.12 6
Finally, mere punctuation should never be allowed to cause ambiguity
or to challenge the otherwise distinct meaning of an instrument, as it is
always subordinate to the text.1 .2 7
For reasons that remain unclear, Texas has dominated recent fixed
vs. floating royalty cases, and all these cases have involved possibilities
of ambiguous instruments. The last non-Texas case found dealing with
the fractional vs. floating problem is Parham v. Worthen Trust out of
the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1996.128 The case involved a 1922
deed by which the appellants-heirs and grantees-obtained an NPRI
burdening the appellees' mineral fee.12 9 The Court affirmed that the
appellants owned a 1/16 rather than a 1/12 royalty interest in the oil
and gas produced pursuant to a lease executed by the appellees in
1992.130
The courts of states other than Texas use different names for vari-
ous interests. In Parham, the court construed the issue as deciding
whether the contested granted interest was a "fractional share" (i.e., a
fixed NPRI) or a "fraction of a share" (i.e., a floating NPRI-note the
use of the word "of"). It noted that the opening granting clause of the
disputed instrument provided:
That we, Claude L. Smith and Helen E. Smith . . . grant, bargain,
sell, convey, set over and assign and deliver unto the said I.L. and
J.P. Cooper the following to-wit: An undivided 1/16 interest in and
123. See Gulf Metals Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Ins. Co., 993 S.W.2d 800, 808 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1999, pet. denied) ("The ambiguity must become evident when the contract is
read in context of the surrounding circumstances. .. ") (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. CBI Indus., 907 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tex. 1995)).
124. El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d 802, 811-12(Tex.
2012) (construing the contract by the express language in the document after account-
ing for the sophistication of the parties).
125. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1951); City
of Houston v. Howe & Wise, 323 S.W.2d 134, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Houston v. Howe & Wise, 373 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. See State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Beaston, 907 S.W.2d 430, 433-34 (Tex.
1995); Coats v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 230 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
127. Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 136 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. 1940)
("The words, not the punctuation, are the controlling guide in construing a
contract.").
128. Parham v. Worthen Tr. Co., 933 S.W.2d 384 (Ark. 1996).
129. Id. at 385.
130. Id.
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to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in the soil and under the
surface thereof that may be produced from the land hereinafter
described.131
The Court noted that if the grant stopped there, the granted interest
would clearly be a fixed royalty interest-a 1/16 NPRI or fractional
share.13 2 As in the prior examples, however, the grant went on:
[S]aid undivided 1/16 interest in the oil, gas and other minerals
herein conveyed is to cover and apply to that portion only, which is
1/2 of 1/8 of the oil, gas and other minerals, reserved by the grantor
herein .... 133
And then:
[T]he grant herein giving the grantee a mineral interest only to 1/16
of the oil, gas or other minerals to be delivered out of any royalty
existing by virtue of any lease now on said land, or any that may be
placed on said land by any party.'3 4
The Court acknowledged that if the appellants' argument was cor-
rect with regard to the second clause and the present lease provided
for a 1/6 lessor's royalty, then the grantee would only receive 1/2 of 1/8
of 1/6, or a 1/96 share. The Court seized upon two points in the
third clause in its interpretation. First, the words "any royalty" con-
templated subsequent leases with varying lessor's royalty.1 3 6 Second,
the words "only to 1/16 of [oil, gas, and minerals]" in the third clause
fixed the royalty reserved at 1/16, regardless of any deviation from the
usual 1/8 lessor's royalty in leases subsequently executed.13 7
The appellants argued that since 1/8 was the traditional lessor's roy-
alty retained in leases at the time, "the grantors used the customary
1/8th designation when they really meant to state 1/2 of whatever in-
terest was retained by the grantors in future leases."138 The Court held
that "an equally logical explanation is that the grantors wished to
make it clear that the interest conveyed was 1/16 of the total produc-
tion and not merely 1/16 of the 1/8 royalty interest they retained" and
that to take up the appellants' argument would be to go beyond the
four corners of an unambiguous instrument; the meaning was
obvious. 3 9
Parham is illustrative of a court using additional language past the
first granting clause to provide a rationale for dismissing judicial rec-
131. Id. at 386 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id. (alteration in original).
134. Id. (alteration in original).




139. Id. (emphasis added) (first citing Wilson v. Brown, 897 S.W.2d 546 (Ark.
1995); then citing Wynn v. Sklar & Phillips Oil Co., 493 S.W.2d 439 (Ark. 1973)).
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ognition of the usual 1/8 lessor's royalty. Interestingly, however, if
both the interpretation ultimately decided upon by the Court and the
appellant's interpretation were thought to be "equally logical," it
would seem to reopen the question of whether the instrument was
ambiguous.
B. On Interpretation
"Contract language that can be given a certain or definite meaning
is not ambiguous and is construed as a matter of law." 14 0 Texas courts
construe an unambiguous deed by ascertaining the intent of the par-
ties from the entire deed plus any exhibits and nothing more.1 41 When
seeking to ascertain the intention of the parties, the court attempts to
harmonize all parts of the instrument.142 Even if different parts of the
deed appear contradictory or inconsistent, Texas courts strive to har-
monize all of the parts, construing the instrument to give effect to all
of its provisions.1 4 3 The court should "not strike down any part of the
deed, unless there is an irreconcilable conflict wherein one part of the
instrument destroys in effect another part thereof."1 44
Opinions covering disputes over the interpretation of instruments
deemed unambiguous typically follow a pattern. First, the facts are
described, followed by the procedural history, culminating in the
lower court ruling and, where determinable, its rationale. Then, often-
times, the court will provide a litany of interpretative tools and canons
that it will apply to the question before it. 1 45 Finally, the opinion fin-
ishes with an application of the tools and canons to the language of
the disputed instrument. While a complete look at this topic is beyond
the scope of this Article, an outline of these interpretative tools and
140. Chrysler Ins. Co. v. Greenspoint Dodge of Hous., Inc., 297 S.W.3d 248, 252
(Tex. 2009).
141. Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. 1957); Luckel v. White, 819
S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Tex. 1991) (first citing 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, THE LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 16.1 (Anderson Publishing Co. 1987); then citing 6 RICHARD R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 899[3], at 81A-108 (P. Rohan ed. 1991)). "That intention,
when ascertained, prevails over arbitrary rules." Id. (quoting Harris v. Windsor, 294
S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1956))).
142. Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986) ("[T]he parties to an instru-
ment intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their
agreement." (citing Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984), overruled by
Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991))).
143. Benge v. Scharbauer, 259 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1953).
144. Id.
145. An excellent compilation of these contract interpretative tools and canons of
interpretation, focusing on New York, was compiled by Vincent Martorama, former
partner in the New York office of Reed Smith LLP, in a white paper entitled A Guide
to Contract Interpretation. Vincent Martorama, A Guide to Contract Interpretation,
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canons is necessary to understand the new fixed vs. floating NPRI
cases.
Any interpretive exercise begins by recognizing that the actual in-
tent of the parties, as expressed in the deed as a whole, controls over
any arbitrary rules.14 6 The interpretation of an unambiguous deed is a
question of law, meaning the court can shut out all other information
and evidence other than the instrument, with its exhibits, by itself,
along with any documents that the instrument references.4 7 In con-
ducting this exercise, Texas courts will construe a deed in a manner
that will avoid a construction that "is unreasonable, inequitable, and
oppressive."148
Texas courts construe contract terms o as "to give rational meaning
to all provisions in the document," whenever possible.149 Therefore,
they avoid striking any part of an instrument in the absence of irrec-
oncilable inconsistencies whereby one clause obliterates the effect of
another.5 o While doing this, courts must keep in mind that
"[1]anguage should be given its plain grammatical meaning unless it
definitely appears that the intention of the parties would thereby be
defeated."'' A court must give the terms of an instrument their plain
and ordinary meanings unless the instrument shows the parties' intent
to interpret the terms in an alternative manner.15 2 Further, "[tlhe in-
tent of a contract is not changed simply because the circumstances do
not precisely match the scenarios anticipated by the contract."1 5 3
C. Rules of Grammar
Rules of grammar may be invoked in litigation over the size of an
interest conveyed or reserved. For example, in Stewman Ranch, Inc. v.
Double M. Ranch, Ltd., the grantors had executed a deed providing
that the conveyance was subject to various outstanding mineral and
royalty interests and reserving "an undivided one-half (1/2) of the roy-
alties to be paid on the production of oil, gas and other hydrocarbons
from the described lands which are presently owned by Grantors
.... "154 In a subsequent dispute over whether the grantors had re-
146. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462.
147. Altman, 712 S.W.2d at 118.
148. Frost Nat'1 Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310, 311-12 (Tex. 2005)
(quoting Reilly v. Rangers Mgmt., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. 1987)).
149. Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons, L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
150. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 (quoting Benge v. Scharbauer, 259 S.W.2d 166, 167
(1953)).
151. Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 792 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. de-
nied) (citing Reilly, 727 S.W.2d at 529).
152. Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) (citing W.
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 261 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1953)).
153. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 167 S.W.3d 840, 841 (Tex. 2005).
154. Stewman Ranch, Inc. v. Double M. Ranch, Ltd., 192 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2006, pet. denied).
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served one-half of all royalties payable on production from the land or
only one-half of the royalties owned by the grantors at the time of the
conveyance, the grantors attempted to invoke the grammatical rule
that a restricting clause that is not set off by commas modifies the
word or phrase immediately preceding it.1 55 They argued that the
phrase "which are presently owned by Grantors" referred to "the de-
scribed lands" rather than to "royalties.""' While acknowledging the
existence of the rule of grammar, the court nonetheless rejected it on
the ground that its application would make the restricting clause su-
perfluous.57 The court held that "which are presently owned by
Grantors" referred to "royalties," and the grantors had thus reserved
only half of the royalties that they owned at the time of the
conveyance.5 s
In contrast with the result reached in Stewman, the Oklahoma court
in James v. Beckwith applied the rule of grammar to a granting clause
that excepted "oil, gas and other minerals, reservations and convey-
ances and oil and gas leases and easements of record."15 9 The court
held that the phrase "of record" did not modify "oil, gas and other
minerals," and the conveyance did not include any interest in the min-
eral estate.16 0
IV. THE LATEST CASES
In a dispute over who owns a mineral or royalty interest, millions of
dollars can be at stake. With unambiguous documents, the court only
has the language in the contested instrument to consider when at-
tempting to divine the intention of the drafters. That this highlights
the need for effective drafting is obvious: The decision to not spend
thousands on sound legal counsel when drafting an instrument can
end up costing millions. Thus, multi-year litigation, costing tens of
thousands of dollars, that examines in excruciating detail a few lines of
scattered instrument language continues today. In addition to Coghill
v. Griffith, detailed above, in the last half-dozen years Texas courts
alone have considered at least seven cases involving squabbles over
whether a conveyance or reservation involved fixed or floating
royalties.
A. Range Resources Corp. v. Bradshaw
The earliest of the seven cases, a memorandum opinion out of the
Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth, involved whether the grantor
155. Id. at 812.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 812-13.
158. Id.
159. James v. Beckwith, 805 P.2d 117, 118 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990).
160. Id. at 119-20.
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of an interest in minerals reserved a fixed or floating NPRI.16' The
royalty reservation provided the following:
[1] The Grantors herein reserve unto themselves, their heirs and as-
signs, and except from this conveyance an undivided one-half (1/2)
Royalty (Being equal to not less than an undivided one-sixteent[h]
(1/16)[)] of all the oil, gas and/or other minerals in, to, and under or
that may be produced from said . . . land ....
[2] Said interest hereby reserved is a Non-Participating Royalty ...
provided, however, that all such leases shall provide for Royalty of
not less than one-eighth (1/8) ....
[3] In the event oil, gas or other minerals are produced from said
land, then said Grantors, their heirs and assigns, shall receive not
less than one-sixteenth (1/16) portion (being equal to one-half (1/2)
of the customary one-eighth (1/8) Royalty) of the entire gross produc-
tion and/or such net proceeds as hereinabove provided ....
The successor grantor, current owner of the NPRI, argued the inter-
est reserved was one-half "of royalty"-a floating NPRI-and the
mineral owners countered that the NPRI reserved was a fixed 1/16
NPRI.163 Echoing the methodology of Luckel, the court examined the
four corners of the instrument to determine the intent of the draft-
ers.164 The court first noted that each paragraph contained the phrase
"not less than" with the parenthetical in paragraph [1] suggesting a
minimum 1/16 NPRI.165
In paragraph [2], the court noted language providing that all leases
"shall provide for a royalty of not less than 1/8" and held that when
the first two paragraphs were read in sequence, it was manifest that
the parties contemplated future leases with varying lessor's royalty.16 6
Paragraph [2] was found to ensure the grantor that the retained NPRI
would be calculated as a product of at least 1/8 royalty-in other
words, a fixed 1/16 NPRI minimum.167 Like the other paragraphs, the
"not less than" language in paragraph [3] made clear that the grantor
would receive a minimum 1/16 NPRI.16 8 Ultimately, the "not less
than" language instructed the court that the NPRI was variable and
not intended to be fixed.16 9
161. Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, No. 2-07-263-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3426
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 8, 2008), withdrawn, 266 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2008, pet. denied).
162. Range Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d at 493-94 (alteration in original).
163. Id. at 492.
164. Id. at 493, 496 (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Tex. 1991)).
165. Id. at 495-96.
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B. Wynne/Jackson Development, L.P. v.
PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd.170
On June 6, 2013, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi
withdrew and substituted its opinion upon rehearing in which it con-
sidered a suit brought by PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd., ("PAC"), which
sought a declaratory judgment that its NPRI under three deeds (col-
lectively, the "Porter Deeds") was a "fraction of" royalty.17 The deed
described the contested NPRI and other interests as:
[A] non-participating royalty of one-half (1/2) of the usual one-
eighth (1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas, and other materials pro-
duced, saved and sold from the above-described property, provided,
however, that although said reserved royalty is non-participating
and Grantee shall own and possess all leasing rights in and to all oil,
gas and other minerals, Grantor shall, nevertheless, have the right
to receive one-half (1/2) of any bonus, overriding royalty interest, or
other payments, similar or dissimilar, payable under the terms of
any oil, as and mineral lease covering the above-described
property. 2
PAC contended that this reservation reserved a fraction of royalty
and thus PAC was entitled to receive an indefinite NPRI equal to one-
half of the royalties in all of the mineral leases, whatever those lessor's
royalty amounts were, that had been executed since 1968 when the
Porter Deeds were first executed. Wynne/Jackson Development, L.P.
and W/J Lakes, L.P. ("Wynne Jackson"), collectively the owner of the
mineral property encumbered by PAC's NPRI, contended that the
NPRI under the Porter Deeds reserved only a definite fractional roy-
alty. Thus, PAC was entitled only to a fixed royalty that was equal to
one-half of 1/8 (or 1/16) of production regardless of the language con-
tained in any mineral leases that had been executed after the Porter
Deeds. After both PAC and Wynne Jackson filed cross motions for
partial summary judgment regarding the proper calculation of PAC's
NPRI, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
PAC.
On appeal, PAC cited the aforementioned Sundance Minerals, L.P.
v. Moore317 in support of its contention that its NPRI under the Porter
Deeds was a floating NPRI. The deed in question in Sundance con-
veyed 515 acres of real mineral property, reserving "an undivided and
non-participating one-half interest in the oil, gas, and other mineral
rights."174 The deed further contained a second statement hat Moore
170. Wynne/Jackson Dev., L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-12-00449-CV,
2013 WL 2470898 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 6, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
171. Id. at *1.
172. Id. at *4.
173. Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2011, pet. denied).
174. Id.
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"shall be entitled to one half of the usual one eighth royalty received
forsuch [sic] oil, gas and other minerals produced from said land."17
The court of appeals in Sundance held that the parties intended to
reserve one-half of the royalty in any future lease and that the second
provision stating "one half of the usual one eighth" limited the reser-
vation to royalty (and thus did not include bonus and delay rentals)
and was merely to serve as an illustration of how the royalty reserva-
tion would be calculated.17 6 Thus, the reserved royalty in Sundance
was not a fixed "fractional royalty" but rather an indefinite or "float-
ing" 1/2 royalty interest that entitled the NPRI owner to one-half of
any future lessor's royalty. The present court, however, was not per-
suaded, as the Sundance court did not quote the entire operative lan-
guage of the deed the court had construed."7 Instead, the Sundance
court had summarized the language of the deed, making it impossible
for the present court to compare and contrast the language of the Sun-
dance deed to the Porter Deeds.178
The court also rejected PAC's proposal that the reservation of bo-
nus payments and delay rentals be construed as a single reservation,
as in Sundance where the language of the deeds purported to reserve
an undivided interest across the entire spectrum of mineral inter-
ests.1 7 9 The court determined that, by doing so, the distinction be-
tween the different components of the mineral estate would be
blurred when the Porter Deeds clearly sought to maintain such dis-
tinction-they clearly reserved the bonus payments and delay rent-
als.so Thus, by relying on the precedent of Harriss v. Ritter""1 and
Pickens v. Hope,1 82 the court of appeals concluded that the Porter
Deeds in this case reserved a fixed NPRI (fractional royalty), not a
fractional NPRI (fraction of royalty). as In that way, although mindful
of Sundance, the case is more similar to Parham, and as one commen-
tator noted, unlike Sundance, the Wynne/Jackson decision purposely
sets aside the mistaken judicial recognition of the usual 1/8 land-
owner's royalty as discussed in Sundance (and, below, Hysaw) "de-
spite the express reference to that royalty in the deed."1 84
175. Id.
176. Id. at 512-13.




181. Harriss v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1955).
182. Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256, 258-59 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ
denied).
183. Wynne/Jackson, 2013 WL 2470898, at *5.
184. Laura H. Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving Perennial Problems
in the Shale Era, 62 U. KAN. L. REv. 97, 120 (2013).
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C. Butler v. Horton18 5
On October 16, 2014, the Eleventh Court of Appeals in Eastland
considered a reservation contained in a 1968 deed. The appellants
were the successors in interest to the grantors in the 1968 deed, and
the appellees comprised the successors in interest to the grantees. The
reservation in the deed was as follows:
There is excepted from this conveyance and reserved unto .. . grant-
ors, their heirs and assigns, one-half of the usual 1/8th royalty on all
oil, gas, [and other minerals,] . . . it being understood and agreed
that it shall not be necessary for the Grantors, their heirs or assigns,
to join in the execution of any mineral lease or leases on the prop-
erty, but that the Grantors, their heirs or assigns, shall be entitled to
one-half of any bonus payments or delay rentals which may be paid
in connection with any lease on the property, and that in the event
of production from said land, either by a lessee, by an owner, or by
anyone else, the Grantors, their heirs or assigns, shall be entitled,
free of cost, to one-half of the royalty on said minerals, as provided
above[.]186
Both parties agreed the disputed instrument was unambiguous and
offered their own interpretations.' The dispute and the question
before the court was typical: Was the reservation in the deed a floating
one-half of lessor's royalty or a fixed 1/16 fractional royalty interest
regardless of the amount that might be provided for in future
leases?'8 8 Appellants (grantors) argued that the phrase "as provided
above" clarified the fact that the interest reserved in favor of their
predecessor in title was a fraction of royalty-a floating NPRI.189 Ap-
pellees (grantees) argued that the phrase "one-half of the usual 1/8
royalty" created a fixed NPRI (1/16) and that the phrase "as provided
above" limited any future royalty interest to that same fraction.190
The court, agreeing the instrument was unambiguous, further
agreed with the appellants/grantors and found a floating NPRI had
been reserved.191 The court pointed to the Williams & Meyers list of
examples of fractions of royalty (i.e., floating NPRIs) quoted above as
rationale for its decision before focusing on the meaning of "as pro-
vided above" at the end of the clause.'92 Appellees/grantees had ar-
gued that the words "as provided above" referred to that-as they
interpreted it-fixed-NPRI language first shown in the reservation in
the second line of the excerpt above. If that were true, the court
noted, the later language in the reservation, "to one-half of the royalty
185. Butler v. Horton, 447 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2014, no pet.).
186. Id. at 516-17 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 517.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 519.
190. Id. at 517.
191. Id. at 519.
192. Id. at 519 (citing 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 15, § 327.2, at 83-84).
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on said minerals"-clear floating-NPRI language-therefore meant
the "as provided above" language that followed, meaning the first res-
ervation was also a floating NPRI like the second clause.1 9 3 On the
other hand, if "as provided above" referred to anything else in the
reservation, then it was even more clear that the reservation was a
reservation of a floating NPRI because of the repeated reference to
"one-half of" in connection with all of the attributes of mineral owner-
ship (except the right to execute leases, a right that was not
reserved).194
D. Graham v. Prochaska"9 s
In an opinion delivered and filed on December 31, 2013, the Fourth
Court of Appeals in San Antonio analyzed a 1950 warranty deed to
determine whether a reserved royalty was a "fixed" or a "floating"
royalty-i.e., whether a reservation of royalty was fixed at the time of
the reservation or whether the reserved royalty was dependent on the
amount of lessor's royalty provided for in future leases.
In 1950, George and Elsie Ann Prochaska (collectively,
"Prochaska") conveyed a tract of land in Karnes County, Texas, to
John and Frances Regmund (collectively, "Regmund"-later includ-
ing Roger Graham, the first named appellant).1 96 The granting clause
conveyed "all that certain tract or parcel of land."19 ' Prochaska, how-
ever, reserved a royalty interest as follows:
SAVE AND EXCEPT, however, there is reserved unto George
Prochaska, his heirs and assigns, one-half (1/2) of the one-eighth (1/
8) royalty to be provided in any and all leases for oil, gas and other
minerals now upon or hereafter given on said land, or any part
thereof, same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16th) of all oil, gas
and other minerals of any nature, free and clear of all costs of pro-
duction, except taxes;
AND PROVIDED this reservation is burdened with paying the
two outstanding mineral royalty reservations, each of One-Fourth
(1/4) of one-eighth (1/8) royalty, one of which reservations is de-
scribed in the deed from John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company to E.S. Joslin, now of record in Vol. 141, page 161, Deed
Records of Karnes County, Texas, and the other reservation is de-
scribed in the deed from E.S. Joslin, et ux to A.W. Powell, Jr., et al
now of record in Vol. 165, page 80 of the Deed Records of Karnes
County, Texas; And this reservation shall only be effective to the
193. Id. at 517, 519.
194. Id. at 519.
195. Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, pet.
denied).
196. Id. at 653.
197. Id.
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extent that one or both of said outstanding reservations become
terminated.
It being the intent of the parties hereto that John W. Regmund and
wife, Frances E. Regmund, as of the effective date hereof, shall be
vested with and entitled to one-half (1/2) of the usual one-eighth
(1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas and other minerals in on and/or
under the property herein conveyed, and the reservation herein
above recited in favor of the grantor herein, shall relate to and
cover only the one-half (1/2) of one-eighth (1/8) royalty interest pre-
viously reserved in favor of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company and Ennis Joslin, if, as and when said interest in favor of
said parties terminate.19 8
The original mineral leases provided for the (then) typical 1/8 les-
sor's royalty in effect at the time of the 1950 conveyance. After these
expired, Regmund executed new leases that provided for a 1/5 lessor's
royalty. Then, as a preventive measure, Regmund filed a lawsuit seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that Prochaska had only reserved a "fixed"
1/16 royalty interest from the 1950 deed. Under the Regmund inter-
pretation, Prochaska would receive 1/16 of production and Regmund
would keep the remaining 11/80 of production from the lessor's roy-
alty (1/5 - 1/16 = 11/80).199
Prochaska counterclaimed for declaratory relief, contending they
were entitled to a "floating" 1/2 royalty interest. Under the interpreta-
tion promoted by Prochaska, they should receive one-half of whatever
lessor's royalty Regmund secured on the conveyed lands, now and in
the future. Accordingly, Prochaska contended they should currently
receive one-tenth of production, which was one-half of the lessor's
royalty, and Regmund would take the remaining 1/10 of production
(1/5 x 1/2 = 1/10).200
Despite the differences in interpretation, both parties contended
that the deed was unambiguous. The trial court held a hearing on the
parties' competing motions for summary judgment before rendering
judgment for Prochaska by construing the deed as reserving a floating
1/2 lessor's royalty interest in the current-and any future-mineral
leases. Regmund appealed.2 0 1
Charged with interpreting the Prochaska-Regmund eed de novo,
the court of appeals first summarized the effect of the three clauses as
follows: The "save and except" clause2 0 2 excluded a royalty interest
from passing under the deed, while the "and provided" clause2 0 3 iden-
tified previously reserved "mineral royalty" interests that encumbered
198. Id. at 653-54.
199. Id. at 654.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 654-55.
202. Id. at 658-61.
203. Id. at 662-64.
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("burdened") the royalty interest of Prochaska. The "intent" clause20
clarified the relationship between the reserved interest of Prochaska,
the received interest of Regmund, and the previously reserved inter-
ests identified in the "provided" clause.
The court of appeals agreed with Prochaska that the "one-eighth
royalty" must be read in light of the surrounding language. The court
refused to construe the "one-eighth" in the description of the lessor's
royalty as a limitation fixing the royalty owned by Prochaska, instead
ruling that its presence reflected the "common misconception of that
period that the landowner's royalty would always be one-eighth of
production obtained under a lease."205 Accordingly, the court then
construed the "one-eighth" within the context of the surrounding lan-
guage ("the .. . royalty to be provided in any and all leases for oil, gas
and other minerals now upon or hereafter given on said land, or any
part thereof") as an objective expression of the parties' intent o mea-
sure the reserved royalty of Prochaska on the basis of any lessor's
royalty on any future lease along with the mistaken assumption that
that landowner's royalty would always be one-eighth of production.20 6
The court then attempted to harmonize the first portion of the
"save and except" clause with the second clause, describing the re-
served interest as "same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16th) of all
oil, gas and other minerals of any nature, free and clear of all costs of
production, except taxes," noting that this language, standing alone,
would normally reserve a fixed royalty interest.2 07 But the court then
held that the first clause showed the parties' true intention that the
royalty "float," and it "harmonized" the second phrase with the first.
The court opined that the parties had again mistakenly believed that
one-half of the lessor's royalty under future leases would always equal
1/16 of production but their true intention was that the overall "save
and except" clause unambiguously showed the intent to reserve one-
half of the lessor's royalty "in any and all leases for oil, gas and other
minerals now upon or hereafter given on said land . . . ."208
The court of appeals then turned to the third and final paragraph
(the "intent" clause) and found that it confirmed both that the parties
had mistakenly assumed that the lessor's royalty in future leases
would always be one-eighth of production ("as of the effective date
hereof, shall be vested with and entitled to one-half (1/2) of the usual
204. Id. at 661-62.
205. Id. at 660 (first citing Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 966
S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex. 1998); then citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex.
1957); then citing 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 4, § 3.7[A], at 3-47; and then citing
Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) ("We give terms
their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning unless the instrument shows
that the parties used them in a technical or different sense.")).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 661.
208. Id.
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one-eighth (1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas and other minerals in on
and/or under the property herein conveyed") and that the interest of
Prochaska would bear the two existing, outstanding, terminable min-
eral royalty reservations until they expired.20 9 Thus, the Prochaska in-
terest was a future interest, not a present or immediately effective
one.
The "as provided" clause describes the two "outstanding mineral
royalty reservations" as terminable interests that preempted immedi-
ate activation of the Prochaska royalty as "each of One-fourth of one-
eighth (1/8) royalty." 2 10 The "intent" clause later repeats this seem-
ingly fixed formula. The court acknowledged that if "outstanding min-
eral royalty reservations" meant "royalty interests," then the
terminable interests would be fixed, and it would be challenging to
interpret the Prochaska reservation of those interests as floating
interests.
However, since the Prochaska-Regmund eed specifically referred
to and identified the two instruments creating the interests that bur-
dened the reservation of Prochaska, those two instruments were in-
corporated into the Prochaska-Regmund eed, and the descriptions of
the interests in the prior deeds were therefore also incorporated into
the Prochaska-Regmund eed. Since the royalty interests in the two
prior instruments were "floating," the court determined that no con-
flict existed in concluding that the Prochaska NPRI reservations also
"floated."
E. Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial211
On June 24, 2015, the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio in-
terpreted a 1949 deed to determine whether the grantors reserved a
floating or fixed NPRI. After determining that the instrument was not
ambiguous, the court determined that the grantors had intended to
reserve a floating royalty.
In September of 1949, Annie Trial, along with six of her eight chil-
dren (collectively, "the Trials"), conveyed by warranty deed (the
"1949 Deed") all surface and mineral interests in a 278-acre tract of
land in Karnes County, Texas.2 12 The grantees were Alex and Leo
Trial, the two other children.2 13 The 1949 deed provided as follows,
with the court's italics added:
There is reserved to each of us signing this deed, except Mrs. An-
nie Trial, our undivided interest in and to the 1/8 royalties paid the
land owner upon production of oil, gas and other minerals from said
209. Id. at 661-62.
210. Id. at 662.
211. Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial, 469 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2015,
pet. denied).
212. Id. at 620-21.
213. Id.
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278 acre tract of land hereby conveyed, and this royalty interest re-
served to each of us shall be non-participating and perpetual.
It is agreed and here stipulated that the 1/8 royalties paid the land
owner upon production of oil, gas and other minerals is hereby
pooled among all the grantors and grantees to this deed, except the
grantor, Mrs. Annie Trial who shall not participate in said royalties,
and in the case of the production of oil, gas and other minerals from
said tract of land, each of the [T]rial heirs named above, except Mrs.
Annie Trial, shall share in said royalties equally.
It is understood that the said Leo Trial and Alex Trial shall have
the right to lease said tract of land for oil, gas or other minerals,
without the joinder of the grantors herein, or their heirs or assigns,
and that said grantees shall have the right to collect the bonus mon-
eys and delay rentals arising out of said mineral leases, but in case of
production of oil, gas or other minerals from said tract of land in
paying quantities each of the Trial Heirs, either grantor or grantee,
except Mrs. Annie Trial shall share equally in said pooled
royalties.214
Medina Interests, Ltd. ("Medina") was the successor-in-interest o
the original grantees-Alex and Leo. Medina entered into a paid-up
oil and gas lease2 15 in 2007, and Marathon Oil was one of the lessees.
In the "Stipulations of Mineral Interests" sent to all of the prospective
royalty owners, Marathon contended that the Trials had reserved "all
of the royalties of leases entered into subsequent o the date of the
1949 Deed ... ."216
Medina sued the Trials for trespass to try title and for money had
and received. Medina contended that the Trial children named as
grantors of the 1949 Deed shared a fixed 1/8 royalty. The Trials argued
that they each were entitled to a portion of a floating royalty. The trial
court determined that the deed reserved a floating royalty for each of
the eight Trial children mentioned as grantors and no royalty for An-
nie Trial, as provided in the deed.2 17
On appeal, the only issue before the court of appeals was whether
the 1949 Deed reserved a fixed or fractional royalty. To interpret the
reservation, the court turned to the examples provided in Williams &
Meyers, Oil and Gas Law-the oft-cited authority on questions of
floating or fixed royalty reservations.2 1 8 The court first noted that the
214. Id. at 624.
215. A paid-up oil and gas lease is one in which the lessee pays all of the delay
rentals for the entire primary term upfront so that the lease will not fail for untimely
or improper payment of delay rentals.
216. Medina, 469 S.W.3d at 621. A stipulation of mineral interests is a tool that oil
producers often use to ensure agreement between the parties as to their prospective
mineral ownership. It is essentially a cross-conveyance in which all parties can agree
on mineral ownership, even when their actual ownership is not completely clear.
217. Id.
218. E.g., Dawkins v. Hysaw, 450 S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014),
rev'd, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
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phrase in the deed "the 1/8 royalties" typically provides for a fixed
royalty.21 9 The court also noted, however, that in interpreting an un-
ambiguous deed, a Texas tribunal must consider the entire document
to harmonize the language and give effect to all provisions within the
deed.2 2 0
Examining in particular the first language in italics above, the court
noted that the 1949 Deed used words that contemplated the possibil-
ity of future production.2 21 This, the court thought, evidenced the idea
that the grantors had contemplated future leasing on the property,
particularly given that no lease was operative on the effective date of
the 1949 Deed, and that they had intended their interests to adjust
according to the royalties under the lease.22 2
Further, the court noted the "estate misconception theory" first
mentioned in Garrett223 and, citing the recently issued Graham opin-
ion and its language quoted above, again found cause to dismiss the
use of the fixed fraction 1/8. The court opined that in older deeds such
as the 1949 Deed, the 1/8 royalty provided to landowners was so con-
sistent and ubiquitous that landowners would often refer to "the 1/8
royalty" when they actually meant to refer to the royalty, of whatever
size, that the lease provided to the landowner.2 2 4
If the 1/8 fraction could be read out of the reservation as the result
of a historical misapprehension, then the fact that the 1949 Deed pro-
vided that the "1/8 royalties" reserved for the grantees and grantors
would be shared and pooled equally becomes more important. Com-
bined with the fact that no lease covered the tract in 1949, this express
equality among grantees and grantors suggests that the quantity of
any future NPRI that floated depending on the amount of lessor's roy-
alty reserved in a lease would be split equally among the eight
children.
Finally, because the grantors reserved "the 1/8 royalties paid the
land owner upon production," and no lease existed at the time of the
conveyance, this was taken as evidence that the word "the" indicated
that this language spoke of whatever the future lessor's royalty hap-
pened to be under future leases-that is, eight kids, each getting an
eighth of the lessor's royalty. And since the same paragraph later dis-
219. Medina, 469 S.W.3d at 624.
220. Id. at 624 (quoting Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)).
221. Medina, 469 S.W.3d at 624. The court did not specifically point to any disposi-
tive language, but examples of language within the deed that contemplates future
production includes "upon production" and "in case of production." Id.
222. See id. at 624-25.
223. See Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex. 1957) (taking judicial notice
"of the fact that the usual royalty provided in mineral leases is one-eighth"); see also
Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991) (citing Garrett, 299 S.W.2d at 907)
("One-eighth was the 'usual' royalty so standard in the 1920s and 1930s that all Texas
courts took judicial notice of it.").
224. Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650, 657-60 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013,
pet. denied).
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cussed "royalties paid the land owner," this was deemed "indicative of
a royalty that 'floats' in accordance with the size of the landowner's
royalty." 22 5
Ultimately, the court held that the Trials had not intended to fix
their ownership at 1/8.226 Therefore, the court affirmed that the trial
court had properly determined that each of the six Trial children re-
served an undivided interest in whatever landowner's royalty was pro-
vided under any current or future oil and gas lease.2 27
F. Leal v. Cuantos Antes Mejor LLC 2 28
On July 1, 2015, the Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the
decision of the district court in Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor LLC, con-
cluding that a conveyance of an NPRI was a floating royalty.229 Based
on that classification, the NPRI holder was entitled to only a fraction
of the royalty. The dispute involved a sale of forty acres in Karnes
County, Texas. In 1978, David Phillip, as grantor, sold approximately
forty acres of land in Karnes County to Rudy Leal and Henry and
Rosalinda Leal, as grantees. The contract for sale included the follow-
ing language: "Subject, however, Grantor reserves all minerals and
royalties, except, [h]owever, Grantor shall convey to Grantees a 1/4
non-participating royalty interest."23 0 In 1988, David Martin Phillip
and his wife, Marguerite W. Phillip (collectively, "the Phillips"), con-
veyed the surface to Andrea Leal, who was then a trustee for Ramiro
Leal, then a minor, and to Robert Leal (collectively, "the Leals").2 31
The deed included several exceptions and reservations but included
the conveyance of 1/4 non-participating royalty interest to the Leals:
In addition to the above exceptions, there is reserved and excepted
unto Grantors [the Phillips] herein, their heirs and assigns, all of the
oil, gas and other minerals in, on and under and that may be pro-
duced from the above described property except an undivided one-
fourth (1/4) non-participating royalty interest hereinafter specifically
conveyed to Grantees [the Leals] ....
There is specifically conveyed to Grantees herein, their heirs and as-
signs, an undivided one-fourth (1/4) interest in and to all of the roy-
alty paid on the production . . . of oil, gas and any and all other
minerals. The interest conveyed unto Grantees shall be a non-par-
ticipating royalty interest and Grantees shall not be required to join
in the making of any oil, gas or other mineral lease or leases,
225. Medina, 469 S.W.3d at 625.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 626.
228. Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor LLC, No. 04-14-00694-CV, 2015 WL 3999034
(Tex. App.-San Antonio July 1, 2015, no pet. h.).
229. Id. at *1.
230. Id.
231. Id. The case involves a contract for sale from 1978 and, ten years later, an
actual conveyance covering the same captioned land.
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whether or not the same contain pooling or unitization clauses, but
shall be entitled to a non-participating interest in and to any royalty
paid from the production . . . of oil, gas and any and all other
minerals.2 32
Thus, the instrument at issue was a rarity in fixed vs. floating litiga-
tion: a grant (instead of a reservation) of freestanding royalty, carved
from a broader reservation of the mineral estate.
The Phillips later executed an oil and gas lease with Hilcorp Energy
as lessee.23 3 The lease covered 152.2 acres of land; the Leals' forty
acres were part of the lease. The Phillips later conveyed their (now
leased) mineral interest to Cuantos Antes Mejor, LLC ("Cuanto").
After the conveyance to Cuanto, the Leals were asked to sign a
"Stipulation of Mineral Interest" and associated division orders,
which, according to the Leals, inaccurately quantified their NPRI. The
Leals filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to
interpret the 1988 deed as conveying to them "an undivided 1/4 inter-
est in and to ALL of the royalty paid on production (1/4 of 8/8 non-
participating royalty interest)."234 In response, Cuanto filed a counter-
claim for declaratory judgment. Cuanto disputed that the deed con-
veyed a floating 1/4 NPRI on the royalty paid on production "from
any oil and gas or other mineral leases on 'subject property' in effect
after [the deed]." Both the Leals and Cuanto filed motions for sum-
mary judgment. Cuanto believed that the division order correctly
stated the Leals' royalty interest. Cuanto's contention was that the
deed conveyed "a non-participating interest in one-fourth (1/4) of any
and all of the royalty paid on production from any oil and gas or other
mineral leases ... including the existing oil and gas lease."2 35 The trial
court granted summary judgment for Cuanto, holding that the 1988
deed conveyed a floating fraction of royalty.2 36
On appeal, after quickly determining that the deed language was
unambiguous, the court of appeals addressed only one issue: whether
the royalty interest conveyed was a fixed NPRI (the Leals' conten-
tion) or a floating NPRI (contention of Cuantos).
The Leals disputed that the royalty was floating for three reasons:
First, the Leals noted that the grantor in the disputed conveyance had
reserved the mineral estate, "except an undivided one-fourth (1/4)
non-participating royalty interest . . . ."23 The Leals believed that be-
cause the deed did not include such words as "the" or "of" before any
232. Id. at *3.
233. Hilcorp then assigned their lease to Marathon Oil Company. Brief of Appellee
at 5-6, Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor, LLC, No. 04-14-00694-CV (Tex. App.-San
Antonio, Dec. 10, 2014).
234. Leal, 2015 WL 3999034, at *1.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *3.
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discrete royalty fraction in the conveying language, a fixed royalty was
therefore conveyed. Additionally, because the deed did not specify a
particular lease but rather "the production," the conveyance therefore
represented a fixed fraction of all production of multiple leases over
time. Generally, the Leals' examination and interpretation of the
words of the first grant echoed the jurisprudence of Krum, focusing on
the language that initially established the disputed property interest.
Second, turning to the second mention of the NPRI in the deed, the
Leals focused on the fact that the deed conveyed a 1/4 interest in and
to "all of the royalty paid on the production," which the Leals con-
strued as a fixed fraction of the total production because, in this in-
stance, the word "the" referred to all production and not just that
fraction of lessor's royalty paid on production under a lease. Thus,
according to the Leals, the conveyance language provided that the
NPRI was to be calculated as a specific fraction-one-fourth-of all
production.238
Third, invoking a common canon of interpretation, the Leals be-
lieved the deed should be construed against the grantor.2 39
The court disagreed with all three of the Leals' arguments and con-
cluded that the deed conveyed a floating royalty.240 First, as might be
expected from the case law described above, the court examined the
deed as a whole to determine the parties' intent, rather than just cer-
tain provisions or language separately. The court noted that, although
the first paragraph of the deed contained only the reservation of the
mineral estate and the conveyance of the NPRI, the deed later ex-
pressed that the royalty was a fraction of a royalty.
This led the court to address the Leals' second point, as it then
noted that the deed provided that the amount of the conveyed royalty
was unambiguously expressed as a fraction of a royalty: "interest in
and to all of the royalty" and "interest in and to any royalty." In the
court's estimation, such language clearly established that the amount
of NPRI depended on the amount of royalty the lease provided. The
language on which the Leals relied-"paid on production" and "paid
from the production"-merely stated the grantors' intent that any
royalty would not be paid unless and until production occurred.
The court disagreed with the Leals' third contention because the
deed was unambiguous, and such canons of interpretation are invoked
only for ambiguous deeds.2 41
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at *4.
241. See Alexander Schroeder Lumber Co. v. Corona, 288 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("The rule of strict construction against
the grantor is resorted to only to resolve ambiguity and as an aid by legal presumption
to arriving at intent.").
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G. Hysaw v. Dawkins2 42
Finally, in early 2016, the Texas Supreme Court waded into the
double-fraction version of the fixed vs. floating NPRI battle with a
decision meant to disentangle confusion originating in a will from
1947. When Ethel Nichols Hysaw executed her will, she owned three
tracts in Karnes County, Texas-a 1,065-acre tract, a 200-acre tract,
and a 150-acre tract.2 43 Her will divided a fee-simple interest in the
1,415 acres of property among her three children as follows: to Inez
Hysaw Foote, 600 acres; to Dorothy Francis Hysaw Burris, 465 acres;
and to Howard Caldwell Hysaw Jr. 350 acres.2 4 4 Regarding the related
mineral estates, the testatrix changed her allocation methodology, en-
cumbering each tract thusly:
I will and bequeath to each of the above named children fee simple
title to the lands designated to go to them, subject, however, to the
following:
That each of my children shall have and hold an undivided one-third
(1/3) of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all oil, gas or other minerals
in or under or that may be produced from any of said lands, the
same being a non-participating royalty interest ... .245
Ethel Hysaw went on to designate the royalty interest devised to each
of her kids in three very similar paragraphs:
[T]hat is to say, that . .. [the named child] shall not participate in
any of the bonus or rentals to keep any lease or leases in force; that
it shall not be necessary for the said [named child] to execute any
oil, gas or mineral lease over the lands of [the siblings], and that it
shall not be necessary for [the named child] to obtain the consent
either orally or written of the said [siblings], to lease any portion of
said land so willed to [the named child] for oil, gas or other miner-
als, but that ... the said [named child] shall receive one-third of one-
eighth royalty, provided there is no royalty sold or conveyed by me
covering the lands so willed to [the child] .. 24
The court noted that before and after executing the will, Ethel
Hysaw made several inter vivos conveyances to her children. In 1946,
she granted equal royalty interests to each child in the two tracts com-
prising the 350 acres received by Howard Hysaw Jr. Two years later,
she then granted the surface estate of 200 acres to Howard Hysaw Jr.
After she died in 1949, the rest of her real property passed via her will.
The three Hysaw children later died, and their property interests in
the captioned land passed to other successors.
Much later, a lease commanding a 1/5 lessor's royalty was executed
over the 600-acre tract of Inez Foote, and a predictable conflict en-
242. Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
243. Id. at *5.
244. Id.
245. Id. (alteration in original).
246. Id. (alteration in original).
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sued concerning the measurement of the NPRIs that burdened the
land. Inez Foote's successors claimed that the tracts of Howard Hysaw
Jr. were burdened with floating NPRIs of equal measure based on the
inter vivos gift, that the 600-acre tract of Inez Foote and the 465-acre
tract of Dorothy Burris were each burdened with three NPRIs fixed at
1/24 (each being one-third of a fixed 1/8), and that any royalties in
excess of the NPRIs were reserved by the fee owner.2 47 The successors
of Dorothy Burris and Howard Hysaw Jr. asserted that the language
instead meant that each child was due a floating NPRI of 1/3 of any
lessor's royalty obtained (1/3 of 1/5, or 1/15, for each successor under
the current lease) and that this interpretation was supported by lan-
guage in the will providing intent for each sibling to receive an equal
share of royalties.248
The trial court sided with the successors of Howard Hysaw, Jr., and
Dorothy Burris and found that the will created three equal floating
NPRIs. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the will unambigu-
ously resulted in the fee mineral interest comprising the 600-acre tract
of Inez Foote and the 465-acre tract of Dorothy Burris being bur-
dened by two fixed 1/24 NPRIs, and the 350-acre mineral fee of How-
ard Hysaw Jr. being burdened by three floating NPRIs measuring 1/3
of any future lessor's royalty from any lease covering that tract.2 49
Therefore, the later inter vivos royalty gifts resulted in the will's devis-
ing equal NPRI royalty shares on the tracts of Howard Hysaw Jr. and,
under the 1/5 lessor's royalty lease, greater royalties to the successor
mineral fee owners on the Inez Foote and Dorothy Burris tracts-a
fixed 1/24 NPRI plus any lessor's royalty remaining after subtracting
the two other fixed 1/24 NPRIs bequeathed to the non-surface-owning
children.2 50
In finding fixed NPRIs on the leased tract, the court of appeals
highlighted, in two extensive sections, examples of both fixed and
floating NPRIs taken from the Williams & Meyers treatise.2 5 1 After
that, the court focused on each individual clause in the disputed in-
strument, examining three different clauses and comparing each to an
example pulled from the case law compiled in the Williams & Meyers
treatise. Each clause individually was found to comport with prior
fixed-NPRI language. Then, attempting to read the clauses together,
the court found that the second provision was "an individualized re-
statement hat affirms both the first royalty provision and the fee sim-
ple title devise."2 52 More globally, the court of appeals rejected the
247. Id. at 6.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 6-7 (citing Dawkins v. Hysaw, 450 S.W.3d 147, 157 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2014), rev'd, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016)).
250. Id. at 7.
251. Id. at 6-7 (citing Dawkins, 450 S.W.3d at 153).
252. Dawkins, 450 S.W.3d at 156.
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argument that Ethel Hysaw had intended that all three children would
get equal royalty, holding simply that the language in each of the por-
tions it examined expressly provided otherwise.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed on January 29, 2016, with an
opinion penned by Justice Eva Guzman. Holding that the court of ap-
peals had "departed from the appropriate analytical approach by con-
struing each royalty provision in isolation" and had merely cited past
examples from the Williams & Meyers treatise and compared each dis-
puted phrase with its closest syntactical match, the Court found that
the NPRIs on the leased tract were floating.25 3 Specifically, the Court
found that the will devised to each of Ethel Hysaw's three children
"an undivided one-third (1/3) of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all
[minerals]," described each fee mineral's right to receive royalty pay-
ments as "one-third of one-eighth royalty," and made clear that
should any further NPRI be later conveyed by Ethel Hysaw from the
captioned land, the children "shall each receive one-third of the re-
mainder of the unsold royalty."2 54
The Court noted that, without other indicators of the intent of the
testatrix, it would be reasonable to interpret the double fraction as a
devise of a fixed 1/3 of 1/8 to each of Ethyl Hysaw's children. The
Court cautioned, however, that before analyzing the meaning of any
particular use of double-fraction language, it was necessary to ex-
amine the entire instrument to deduce how each disputed phrase in-
teracted with the rest in order to divine the overall intent.2 5 5 In the
present case, the Court found clear intent by Ethel Hysaw to divide
the royalty equally among the three children, citing four indicators:
(1) the deliberate recitation of identical language to effect each
child's royalty inheritance;
(2) the use of double fractions in lieu of single fixed fractions, with
one fraction connoting equality among the three children (1/3) and
the other raising the specter of estate misconception or use of the
then-standard 1/8 royalty as a synonym for the landowner's royalty;
(3) the first royalty provision's global application to all the children
and the second provision's language restating the royalty devise of
each child individually; and
(4) the equal-sharing language in the third and final royalty
clause.2 56
The Court believed that the most indicative datum of testamentary
intent was the equal-royalty-sharing language of the will's third roy-
253. Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 13-14.
254. Id. at 14-15 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
255. Id. at 14 (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 906-07 (Tex. 1957)) (sug-
gesting Garrett supports the proposition that "use of double [royalty] fraction juxta-
posed with single fraction in another provision clarified that the grantor intended to
reserve [a] floating [NPRI] under future leases.").
256. Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 15 (emphasis added). The four points cited are exact
quotes that have been parsed out.
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alty clause-that in the event of an inter vivos royalty sale, each child
would receive "one-third of the remainder of the unsold royalty." The
court of appeals had also found this to convey floating NPRIs, but the
Supreme Court looked past the meaning of the isolated phrase and
took it as indicative of intent by the testatrix to re-equalize the float-
ing NPRIs of all the children if any particular sibling received an inter
vivos gift, and more globally, intent to convey equal floating NPRIs to
all children over all the captioned acreage. This, the Court opined, was
the holistic approach made necessary by the various shards of intent
scattered throughout the contested instrument.2 5 7
V. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF FIXED VS. FLOATING
INTERPRETATION
The first step in interpreting the mineral or royalty interest reserved
or conveyed in any instrument is to acknowledge that all the pertinent
conveying/reserving language must be considered, that the days of
Krum-style "first grant counts" title examination are over, and that
the days of the previous "default setting" of choosing a fixed over
floating royalty whenever the court is in doubt seem to be waning.2 58
Therefore, the first action to take when considering what an instru-
ment conveys or reserves is to highlight all even remotely operational
language that attempts to describe the identity and quantum of con-
veyed or reserved interests.
Second, when considering all the pertinent language, are the terms
inherently ambiguous? A conveyance or reservation is ambiguous if it
is reasonably susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
While recent Texas opinions have hesitated to hold instruments am-
biguous, this is not always the case.2 59 When considering litigation
strategy, whether to claim that an instrument is ambiguous or unam-
biguous is an important decision. If both sides agree the disputed in-
strument is unambiguous, the courts commonly deem the instrument
so without much discussion. This places the determination of the
meaning of the disputed terms solely in the hands of the court as a
matter of law. The role of the parties, then, is reduced merely to argu-
ing which interpretation is better.
257. Id. at 13.
258. See Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial, 469 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2015, pet. denied).
259. On Feb. 4, 2016, the Texarkana Court of Appeals, in Mueller v. Davis, held
ambiguous a sentence in a deed that appeared to have unequivocally conveyed all of
the grantor's mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty interests in Harrison County.
Mueller v. Davis, 485 S.W.3d 622, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016, no pet. h.).
Before Mueller, the last oil and gas case to hold a term ambiguous in Texas-at least
in a mineral or royalty deed construction context-appears to be Gore Oil Co. v.
Roosth, 158 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet.). The Author thanks Wil-
liam Burford for this information.
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The court, then, will use the various canons of interpretation and
case law described above, only perhaps guided by the arguments
presented by the parties, to decide what the instrument conveys or
reserves. The result may be something that neither party wanted, ex-
pected, or even thought possible. It is important to have a good under-
standing of the fixed vs. floating royalty case law landscape and the
interpretive prisms through which a court will examine conveyance
language. If a party predicts that the case law and/or canons of inter-
pretation are likely to result in the court's deciding upon an unwel-
come interpretation, initially claiming that the instrument is
ambiguous may be the better (if still perilous) strategy.
The latest cases provide more guidance-or at least grist for consid-
eration. In Range Resources, the court seized on the repeated use of
the phrase "not less than" and harked back to Luckel to hold that the
reserved interest could not be a fixed NPRI and therefore a one-half
"of royalty" was reserved by grantor.260 The significance of the case is
that it renews "four corners" analysis as a basis for unraveling similar
language.
In Wynne/Jackson, the dispute revolved around two different
phrases: "[an NPRI of] one-half (1/2) of the usual one-eighth (1/8)
royalty in and to all oil, gas, and other materials produced, saved and
sold from the above-described property," and "[g]rantor shall, never-
theless, have the right to receive one-half (1/2) of any bonus, overrid-
ing royalty interest, or other payments . .. payable under the terms of
any oil, gas and mineral lease covering the ... property."26 1 Compared
with the other recent cases, this was a simpler question with fewer
parts to consider and no odd familial components, such as the eight
siblings contesting a 1/8 royalty in Hysaw.
The Wynne/Jackson court found a fixed NPRI after it had refused
to apply Sundance, as in that case no quote of the entire operative
language in the disputed instrument could be found. Although seem-
ingly a sound application of cautious jurisprudence by the Wynne/
Jackson court, the idea raised by the Sundance court-setting aside
the hitherto-typical judicial recognition of the usual 1/8 lessor's royalty
and its mechanical application to interpreting instruments by Texas
courts in fixed vs. floating royalty disputes-seems likely to continue
to thrive.
Subsequent application of Sundance (i.e., setting aside judicial rec-
ognition of a typical 1/8 lessor's royalty) and the interpretive principle
that a court must attempt to discern the drafters' intent from all the
language of the instrument (i.e., four corners interpretation) come to
260. Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 496-97 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2008, pet. denied).
261. Wynne/Jackson Dev., L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-12-00449-CV,
2013 WL 2470898, at *4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 6, 2013, pet. denied) (mem.
op.).
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the fore in varying degrees in Horton, Graham, Median, and Leal.
Each bears a closer examination.
Horton presents a relatively straightforward application of the Sun-
dance jurisprudence to very similar language found in that case. The
court's explanation of why it arrived at a floating royalty is muddled
and difficult to follow as it applies to translating the actual words,
which suggests that the court had decided what the result would be
before it dug into the language. Ultimately, Horton appears to be an
example of a Texas court's reliance upon "magic words" that can be
easily categorized by the use of the Williams & Meyers treatise, as well
an instance of a court struggling with unclear language because of its
strong predilection not to have outside evidence considered.
In Graham, the dispute was of a now-classic pattern: an opening
grant followed by language that casts the drafter's initial intent into
doubt. Standing alone, the opening clause-"there is reserved ... one-
half (1/2) of the one-eighth (1/8) royalty to be provided in any and all
leases for oil, gas and other minerals now upon or hereafter given on
said land, or any part thereof, same being equal to one-sixteenth
(1/16th) of all oil, gas and other minerals"-would seem to be a fixed
royalty reservation ("same being equal to . . .").262 The court noted
that "courts generally construe simple grants or reservations of a 'frac-
tion of one-eighth' or its variations as creating a fixed royalty interest,
the size of which is determined by multiplying the two fractions to-
gether."263 Another possibility, applying logic similar to that found in
Luckel, could have been a royalty reservation with 1/16 being the min-
imum amount, as all leases should provide for a lessor's royalty of at
least 1/8 ("the one-eighth (1/8) royalty to be provided in any and all
leases . . .").
However, after examining the remaining language in the disputed
instrument and other documents referenced therein, the court con-
cluded that the parties had intended that a floating NPRI be reserved
and they had assumed incorrectly that the lessor's royalty provided in
any oil and gas lease would always be 1/8.264 Therefore, the Graham
court noted-perhaps articulating what many law professors and prac-
titioners have long thought-that while the instrument reflected an
objective expression of the parties' intent to measure the reserved
NPRI of Prochaska on the basis of any lessor's royalty on any future
lease, it also contained the erroneous assumption that the lessor's roy-
alty in leases would always be 1/8 of production. In reaching this desti-
nation, the court focused on the words "the usual one-eighth" and
explained that the presence of that phrase "reflects the common mis-
262. Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013,
pet. denied) (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 658 (citations omitted).
264. Id. at 661-62.
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conception of that period that the landowner's royalty would always
be one-eighth of production obtained under a lease."2 65
This is a big step-perhaps the big step-in fixed vs. floating NPRI
jurisprudence, because courts that follow this precedent of taking judi-
cial notice of a historical muddle can, it seems, dispense more easily
with having to contend with troublesome language that they believe
arises from this (apparently) mistaken assumption. It follows, then,
that when contemplating the "four corners" of a disputed instrument,
courts looking to Graham will consider some language to lie outside
the corners despite the words' appearance in the disputed instrument.
Medina involved an NPRI reservation carved out of the mineral es-
tate with the language "[reserving an] undivided interest in and to the
1/8 royalties paid the land owner upon production of oil, gas and other
minerals from said 278-acre tract of land."266 As in Graham, the court
considered the historical lessor's royalty mistake-"the estate miscon-
ception theory"-first mentioned in Garrett. The Medina analysis,
however, also highlights another interpretation consideration for
courts: Does the conveyance/reservation instrument contemplate fu-
ture leasing and production? The Medina court discerned what it con-
strued as evidence for the idea that the drafters contemplated future
leasing and that this manifested intent that the NPRI float, depending
on the lessor's royalty in any new lease.26 7
Such analysis tips the balance heavily toward a "floating NPRI" in-
terpretation when the type of NPRI is in dispute. If no lease exists at
the effective time of the disputed conveyance or reservation, then any
NPRI conveyed or reserved therein, by definition, contemplates fu-
ture leases; and if Medina resonates with the fact finder and the fact
finder can find similar language in the disputed instrument, a floating
NPRI is more likely to be the result. In Medina, the court read the
grantor's reservation-"the 1/8 royalties paid the land owner upon
production" and "royalties paid the land owner"-and just from those
two phrases divined that, because no lease existed on the captioned
land when the deed was executed, the mere use of the common word
"the" could only be interpreted as referring to the lessor's royalty to
be divided among the eight children of Annie Trial-whatever lessor's
royalty might be negotiated in a future lease.
As if the use of the word "the" in Medina had not set the bar low
enough for finding the future intent to lease minerals, the Medina
court then scrutinized the rest of the instrument for such intent. Find-
ing this intent in the subsequent, arguably innocuous, language de-
265. Id. at 660 (first citing Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 966
S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex. 1998); then citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex.
1957); and then citing 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 4, § 3.7[A], at 3-47).
266. Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial, 469 S.W.3d 619, 621 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2015, pet. denied).
267. Id. at 625-26.
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scribed above, the Medina court expanded the meaning of the
presence of this apparent contemplation of future leasing to mean that
the parties had therefore contemplated lessor's royalties different
from the (then) standard 1/8 lessor's royalty. This leap from finding
the intention to lease in the future to finding that the parties had con-
templated future lessor's royalties other than 1/8 is not so obvious,
and although title examiners cannot possibly divine what the parties
were thinking, it is quite possible that this had never crossed the minds
of the instrument's drafters.
If a lease does exist at the effective time of the disputed conveyance
or reservation, then this analysis does not seem so obviously tilted to-
ward the finding of a floating NPRI using the logic of Medina. The
reference to "the 1/8 royalties paid" could then refer to the lessor's
royalties provided for in the existing lease and could therefore possi-
bly not imply that the parties were contemplating future leasing.
With regard to future application of Medina, the case poses a
unique consideration: the highly unlikely presence of exactly eight sib-
lings, each (apparently) entitled to an equal eighth portion of the les-
sor's royalty on any future leases. Although the court does not
mention any equitable grounds for finding that all the children get the
same amount, rather than two probably getting more under future
leases containing royalties higher than 1/8, it is not difficult to imagine
that a desire for equality among siblings imperceptibly shaded the
opinion, or that future courts and attorneys may try to distinguish Me-
dina on the grounds of its improbable fact pattern. After all, conven-
tional wisdom might exclaim, why would a mother favor one group of
her children over another? Possible answers to such questions-per-
haps, for example, she had previously given money to the six children
in the grantor class and not to the two grantees-lie outside the four
corners of the document.
But while it may seem logical that a mother would typically want
each of her children to share equally, when considering an unambigu-
ous instrument, it is not the intent of the parties that matters but
rather the language of the instrument and those that it references. As
the Luckel court noted, "[e]ven if the court could discern the actual
intent, it is not the actual intent of the parties that governs, but the
actual intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument as a whole,
'without reference to matters of mere form, relative position of de-
scriptions, technicalities, or arbitrary rules."'268
Leal, the latest of the recent Texas fixed vs. floating NPRI cases,
again centered on multiple disparate phrases. The initial granting
clause included:
268. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 84 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935)).
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[E]xcept an undivided one-fourth (1/4) non-participating royalty in-
terest hereinafter specifically conveyed to Grantees [the
Leals] ... 269
then continues later in a second paragraph:
There is specifically conveyed to Grantees herein, their heirs and
assigns, an undivided one-fourth (1/4) interest in and to all of the
royalty paid on the production .... o
and still later in that paragraph:
[Grantees] shall be entitled to a non-participating interest in and to
any royalty paid from the production . . . .2
Although the third clause seems to mention an NPRI without any
quantitative value, that clause is found at the end of the sentence im-
mediately after the second clause. Considering again all the words in
the paragraph hosting both clauses, clearly the third clause is in refer-
ence to the 1/4 of royalty defined in the second clause.
If just the first clause is considered, this reservation seems clearly
worded to convey a fixed 1/4 NPRI. Only the consideration of the
following two clauses-as required under the "four corners" interpre-
tation rule-pushes the NPRI into the floating realm. Thus, this exam-
ple provides two starkly different results depending on the application
of the repugnant-to-the-grant rule highlighted in Krum vs. the "four
corners" rule highlighted in Luckel.
Hysaw is where the Texas Supreme Court, seeming to favor Gra-
ham, charts a tentative course for future fixed vs. floating NPRI case
analysis, particularly for instruments that involve double fractions,
multiple clauses, suggestions of parties operating under the assump-
tion that all future lessor's royalties would be fixed at 1/8, and family
members conveying and reserving mineral and royalty interests to one
another.
First, after the preliminaries, the Court addressed the double-frac-
tion dilemma. It noted that "the possibility that the parties were oper-
ating under the assumption that future royalties would remain 1/8 will
not alter clear and unambiguous language that can otherwise be har-
monized."2 7 2 Here, the Court rightfully removed the trap of trying to
determine whether the drafters were operating under the eternal 1/8
lessor's royalty misconception, saying that interpreters must focus in-
stead on the language.
Then the Court stated a truism: "[T]he reality is that use of 1/8 (or a
multiple of 1/8) in some instruments undoubtedly embodies the par-
ties' [mistaken] expectation that a future lease will provide the typical
269. Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor LLC, No. 04-14-00694-CV, 2015 WL 3999034, *3
(Tex. App.-San Antonio July 1, 2015, no pet. h.) (emphasis omitted).
270. Id. (emphasis omitted).
271. Id. (emphasis omitted).
272. Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. 2016).
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1/8th [lessor's] royalty with no intent to convey a fixed fraction of
gross production."273 This is undoubtedly true in some instances;
which particular instances these are, however, remains unknown,
hence all the litigation. The Court noted authorities that believe that
use of 1/8 in a double fraction makes clear (to them, anyway) that the
drafters were operating under the eternal 1/8 lessor's royalty miscon-
ception. Further on, the Court noted that no unifying premise has
emerged on the fixed vs. floating NPRI royalty.
While the Hysaw Court acknowledged the benefit of a "mechani-
cally applied, mathematical approach," it claimed that such an ap-
proach failed to recognize the "significance to the use of double
fractions in lieu of a single fraction and, in doing so, may interpolate
words not actually expressed in an instrument (i.e. a fixed single frac-
tion)."27 4 Further, the Court claimed that prior opinions that used
double-fraction language (Garrett, Luckel, and Concord Oil) "ad-
here[d] to an analytical approach that emphasizes the four-corners
rule and harmonization principles," and the floating NPRI cases typi-
cally involved more complicated, multi-part conveyances/reservations
than the fixed NPRI cases, which required more creative interpreta-
tions that scrutinized every word.2 75
One commentator has noted that after Hysaw, "one can be certain
of the construction of a royalty expressed as a fraction of one-eighth
only if absolutely identical language has been definitively construed in
an earlier case, if then."2 76 Such cases cannot put title examiners at
ease, as they eschew a more mechanical reading that would allow a
more definitive interpretation of NPRIs. While mention of the frac-
tion "of 1/8" cannot be automatically assumed to mean "of any future
lessor's royalty" without other indicia of intent for a floating NPRI to
be conveyed or reserved, a case-by-case analysis still appears neces-
sary to divine the drafter's intent. "Misconceptions" of what the draft-
ing parties thought the future royalty could be lie outside the four
corners, however, and using Hysaw's "holistic" approach to NPRIs
expressed as double-fractions to craft a "royalty interpretation to suit
their own, possibly ill-informed, suspicions of the parties' intent"27 7 is
a hazard that courts must avoid.
VI. THE SHADOW OF AMBIGUITY AND A PROPOSAL
Gone are the days when Krum's repugnant-to-the-grant doctrine
ruled the oil and gas property records. Now appellate judges can de-
cide on their own what an unambiguous instrument conveys or
273. Id.
274. Id. at 12.
275. Id.
276. William B. Burford, Case Law Update, Proceedings of the 18th Annual Per-
mian Basin Oil & Gas Law Seminar, Chapter A-2, Feb. 26, 2016.
277. Id.
2016] 87
TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW
reserves, perhaps indulging themselves in trying to come to as clever
an interpretation as the Court managed in Luckel.2 7 8 Such interpreta-
tions can become sophistic brainteasers in which the challenge is to
examine every word and phrase, leaving none out and none redundant
in the quest to arrive at an interpretation that satisfies this logic.27 9
That this curious exercise might result in an interpretation that does
not in any way resemble the actual intent of the drafters is immaterial.
The third argument in Leal-that the deed should be construed
against the grantor-is flatly discounted as being applicable only in
the instance of an instrument deemed ambiguous, a seemingly uncom-
mon finding in oil and gas instrument interpretation problems. Some-
times, however, documents really are ambiguous. Care should be
taken by courts to avoid glossing over the necessary analysis of
whether an instrument is ambiguous or unambiguous in a hurry to
come to the latter conclusion. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently opined in Total E & P USA, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas
Corp., a case interpreting Louisiana law, "when the words of the con-
tract are not clear and explicit, but are ambiguous, a court should en-
gage in further interpretation in search of the parties' intent by
applying [state law] on contractual interpretation and pertinent [state]
cases."2 80 This further interpretation is necessary even though it opens
the door to fact questions about the parties' intent that could require
lengthy and contentious discovery and a trial on the merits of difficult
facts. As the Louisiana Supreme Court noted,
[i]n ascertaining [the contracting parties'] intention (where it cannot
be adequately discerned from the contract or agreement as a whole)
the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of contracting
are a relevant subject of inquiry.... The custom of the industry may
also be considered in determininp the true intent of the parties as to
ambiguous contract provisions.
If a document contains ambiguous terms, they must be resolved.
This is when courts look to canons of interpretation. Application of
two such canons appears particularly inviting in interpreting instru-
ments containing ambiguous fixed vs. floating NPRI clauses: the ca-
nons of "construe against the grantor" and "the greatest estate
passes."
In Texas, the "construe against the grantor" or "construe in favor of
the grantee" canon of interpretation has been recognized for over a
278. See, e.g., Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462-63 (Tex. 1991).
279. Such puzzles are like catnip to some appellate judges, considering the person-
alities of the judges that the Author has met over the years.
280. Total E & P USA, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 711 F.3d 478, 494 (5th
Cir. 2013) (citing Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1339-40 (La.
1982)).
281. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1339-40 (first citing Cooley v. Meridian Lumber Co., 197
So. 2d 255, 258 (La. 1940); then citing Fee v. Vancouver Plywood Co., Inc., 331 So. 2d
151 (La. Ct. App. 1976)).
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century.28 2 In Curdy v. Stafford, the Texas Supreme Court stated that
when a grantor creates a deed-using his or her own language-it
should be construed against the grantor when there is doubt.2 83 In
other words, if the grantor reserves an interest when drafting a deed,
it will be construed in favor of the grantee.28 4
In Elder v. Anadarko E & P Co., L.P., the grantor conveyed a roy-
alty interest in "the following described lands ituated in the County
of Rusk ... ."285 The contract referenced an "Exhibit A," which in-
cluded four tracts in Rusk County and eight tracts in Gregg County.2 86
The grantor contended that only the Rusk tracts were conveyed-not
the Gregg tracts-because the contract said "lands situated in the
County of Rusk."m2 " The court disagreed, holding that the contract
conveyed both the Rusk and Gregg County tracts.2 88 Additionally, the
court recognized that this holding was consistent with the canons of
interpretation, specifically that the contract was construed against the
grantor.2 8 9
Equitable principles lurk at the root of this canon: Generally, the
grantor drafts the deed.29 0 Thus, the grantor usually has the initial ad-
vantage. The grantor should therefore not receive the benefit of the
doubt when he or she does not provide clear language.2 91 Courts have
sometimes construed deeds against the grantor, however, when the
grantee drafted the instrument.29 2 Again, as the Leal court discovered,
this canon should not be used if no ambiguity exists.2 93 Rather, the
canon is to be used as an aid for courts to harmonize the deed and
effectuate the intent of the parties.2 94
282. Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and
Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1.,
108-117 (1993) (stating that Texas courts later used the word "ambiguous" to describe
when the canon of interpretation was necessary); see also Curdy v. Stafford, 30 S.W.
551, 552 (Tex. 1895).
283. Curdy, 30 S.W. at 552.
284. Settegast v. Foley Bros. Dry Goods Co., 270 S.W. 1014, 1016 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1925).
285. Elder v. Anadarko E & P Co., No. 12-10-00250-CV, 2011 WL 2713817, at *1
(Tex. App.-Tyler July 13, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Richard F. Brown, 385
Elder v. Anadarko E & P Co., BROWN & FORTUNATO, P.C., http://www.bf-law.com/
385-elder-v-anadarko-e-p-co/ [https://perma.cc/ZTP8-WDAY].




290. Kramer, supra note 282, at 116.
291. Id.
292. Id. (citing McGuire v. Bruce, 332 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1959, writ ref'd)).
293. Luckel v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990),
rev'd, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
294. Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[Construing against the grantor] ... is not
applicable in the absence of ambiguity, and even in its presence is never used as a
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Of related interest is the common-law rule of the "greatest possible
estate." Under this theory, a deed will pass the entire estate owned by
the grantor unless the grantor reserves or excepts a portion of the
estate conveyed.2 9 5 In Texas, it is presumed that a fee simple is con-
veyed unless "limited by express words," and deeds are construed to
convey the "greatest estate" that the instrument will allow.296 There-
fore, with oil and gas conveyances, the surface and mineral estate
would be conveyed-but could be severed with a reservation or
exception.2 9 7
In Texas, the "greatest possible estate" rule has been applied in the
context of oil and gas real property. For example, it was once ques-
tioned whether the "greatest possible estate" theory applied to the
executive right. Originally, the executive right-the right to lease-
was treated as a contract-based right.29 8 In Pan American Petroleum
Corp. v. Cain, the Texas Supreme Court addressed one issue: whether
a reservation of the executive right remained with the grantor's heirs
upon the grantor's death.2 9 9 The Court concluded that unless the par-
ties intended for the executive right to be retained with the heirs, it
terminated upon the death of the holder."oo Under this rationale, the
executive right was treated as a contractual right.
In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court revisited the process of convey-
ing/reserving the executive right in Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum,
Inc. 3 0 1 In the case, a grantee was conveyed eighty acres, a 1/2 fee min-
eral interest, and the executive right.3 0 2 Next, the grantee conveyed a
portion of the acreage to a third party, reserving a 1/4 mineral interest;
this conveyance did not mention the executive right.303 The third party
executed a mineral lease, using the executive right.3 04
The grantee argued that the executive right should be treated as a
contract-based interest, requiring an "express assignment."30 5 Citing
Cain, the grantee contended that because the executive right was not
mentioned in the conveyance to the third party, it retained the execu-
hypercritical and overly literal tool to override the manifest object and purpose of the
language of writings.") (quoting Alexander Schroeder Lumber Co. v. Corona, 288
S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
295. Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 n.1 (Tex. 1990).
296. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.001(a) (West 2016); Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463,
465 (Tex. 1963).
297. See Talley v. Howsley, 176 S.W.2d 158, 158 (Tex. 1943).
298. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Cain, 355 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex. 1962), overruled
by Day & Co., 786 S.W.2d 667.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 509.
301. Day & Co., 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
302. Id. at 667-68.
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tive right.3 06 On the other hand, the third party and its lessee asserted
that the executive right is a real property interest. Therefore, property
law should apply, specifically, the "greatest possible estate" rule.30 7
The Court agreed with the grantor and its lessee: The executive right
is a real property interest upon which property principles govern.3 08 In
its holding, the Court overruled Cain and concluded that the executive
right was conveyed to the third party because the grantee did not re-
serve or except the interest.3 0 9
How can these two canons be applied to fixed vs. floating NPRI
dilemmas rooted in ambiguous terms? If the operative language is
truly unclear, as in references to the "usual 1/8th royalty"-now ap-
parently a mistaken assumption to be read out of the instrument-but
it is also followed by references to a clearly fixed 1/16 NPRI, expen-
sive fact-finding may be avoided, and title opinion writers may be hap-
pier when these two canons are exercised in lieu of labyrinthine
attempts to divine intent from multiple parts of a long and compli-
cated instrument. For example, if the ambiguous example clauses just
mentioned together constitute a reservation, then a court could con-
strue the instrument against the grantor or use the greatest-estate ca-
non to deem an NPRI "fixed" (a fractional freestanding royalty),
which almost always will be equal to or less than the quantity of a
floating NPRI. In the rarer circumstance in which the NPRI is granted
and not reserved, the same canons could be applied to reach the oppo-
site result, namely that a floating NPRI (fraction of freestanding roy-
alty) was conveyed.
Functionally, if more cases result in disputed instruments being
deemed ambiguous in part or in whole, more trials will need to be
conducted with juries and district court judges determining the mean-
ings of ambiguous terms. Appellate courts will then consider the re-
sults in a different light-not de novo, but rather focused on whether
or not the fact finder made a reasonable decision given the facts
before it. In essence, district courts will make the interpretive call, and
appellate courts will act more as referees rather than a second round
of independent interpreters.
Trial courts in such a role may well face a hard task, not only deter-
mining what evidence to consider outside the four corners of the doc-
ument but in circumstances when no such evidence exists. This would
be especially common in instances in which a disputed instrument was
very old, nobody remained who could attest to the meaning of its con-
tents, and no other extrinsic evidence existed, such as drafts or corre-
306. Id. at 668-69.
307. Id. at 668.
308. Id. at 669 ("We erred in Cain when we compared the executive right to a
power of appointment. Although the executive right is similar to a power, it is not a
product of contract, but rather a creature of property rights." (emphasis added)).
309. Id. at 669-70.
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spondence. In addition, as a matter of public policy, such evidential
scavenger hunts may prove expensive and time-consuming in the
aggregate.
In the (admittedly rare) instance where the grant or reservation of a
disputed NPRI is held unambiguous, little other language exists
outside the granting clause from which to divine intent, and no indica-
tion exists within the granting clause that the parties were operating
under a misconception regarding future royalties differing from 1/8,
the Author proposes that the finding of a fixed NPRI should be fa-
vored. For example, considering the language granting or reserving,
"an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the royalty that may be
payable under any and all oil and gas leases, by which royalty is meant
1/8th of production"-provided this is considered unambiguous,
which is not an easy call-then a holding finding a floating NPRI es-
sentially reads out he last clause, misconception or not. In contrast, a
holding finding a fixed NPRI does not read out any specific portion of
the first clause; although rambling, both clauses are necessary to make
sense of the grant or reservation.
Prolixity is not the same thing as a misapprehension. Without indi-
cation of a misconception-e.g., "by which royalty is meant the usual
1/8th of production" or similar-all the words in an instrument should
usually be given effect. Recognition of such a canon of instrument in-
terpretation would help title examiners in certain instances and pro-
vide courts some certainty given the lack of further language.
VII. CONCLUSION
Outside of Wynne/Jackson, which is predicted herein to do little to
promote the finding of a fixed NPRI in other instruments, the latest
Texas cases would appear to make the fixed vs. floating NPRI exercise
more likely to result in a floating NPRI. Graham echoes Sundance as
an enabler for courts seeking to disregard judicial recognition of the
usual 1/8 landowner's royalty. If no lease burdened the captioned land
at the time, the court then could hunt for language in the document
that it could construe as contemplating future leasing-an ostensibly
easy task for the Medina court. If found, the final step-as suggested
by Medina-is to see whether that language can be construed as to
possibly contemplate varying quantities of lessor's royalty in any fu-
ture leases.
Hysaw scrutinizes the double-fraction problem on a tract with no
lease at the time of NPRI reservation in light of the historical plateau
of 1/8 lessor's royalty and the assumption that this would continue
indefinitely. The case applies a "holistic" approach with the idea that
the very fact that the drafters used double fractions in lieu of a single
fraction, combined with other indicia in the instrument, may suggest
that the intention of the parties was for the NPRI to float dependent
on future lessor's royalty.
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While it is tempting to seek a simple and mechanical solution that
can be applied to all instances of the seemingly endless parade of frus-
trating, expensive, and ostensibly trivial litigation that can arise from a
couple of problematic lines found in a property instrument from
eighty years before, these problems are unlikely to disappear over-
night for at least three reasons. First, there is no end to the permuta-
tions of troublesome phrases that can be included in an instrument;
bad drafting is a many-splendored thing. Second, despite the out-
wardly innocuous phrases and recondite interpretive schemes that are
applied, millions of dollars may be at stake-dollars that provide oxy-
gen to the litigious conflagrations that follow. Third, such interpreta-
tive battles are reviewed de novo by appellate courts. Don't like the
trial-level result? Why not appeal when you can present your argu-
ment anew upon a clean slate? For these reasons, fixed vs. floating
royalty cases like the ones described above are likely to continue, only
slowly declining in number as the once nearly universal 1/8 lessor's
royalties recede into the historical rear-view mirror.

